The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a released two fact sheets to give IT leaders and network defenders an improved understanding of current threats against accounts and systems that use multi-factor authentication (MFA), Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA and Implementing Number Matching in MFA Applications.

 

Because not all forms of MFA are equally secure, the phishing-resistant fact sheet informs organizations and users of the threats to MFA and how to implement the most secure form of MFA. CISA also published an infographic of the hierarchy of MFA options that is available at CISA.gov/MFA, which shows phishing-resistant MFA as the strongest choice.

 

For small and medium-size business that cannot immediately implement phishing-resistant MFA, the fact sheet on implementing number matching provides guidance for organizations to mobile push with number matching as an interim option. While number matching MFA is a great interim mitigation, CISA encourages organizations to develop plans to migrate to phishing resistant MFA.

 

As part of long and intermediate-term plans to apply Zero Trust principles, CISA encourages all organizations to implement phishing-resistant MFA. CISA recommends that organizations identify systems that do not support MFA and develop a plan to either upgrade these systems to support MFA or migrate to new systems that support MFA.

 

In the past year, CISA has seen bypass attacks on MFA increase and intensify. However, we only have heard about some of these bypass attacks because the attackers went public. All organizations should share information on incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at [email protected] or Report | CISA and/or to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBI’s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or [email protected].

 

The NJCCIC encourages recipients who discover signs of malicious cyber activity to contact the NJCCIC via the cyber incident report form at www.cyber.nj.gov/report.

 Here is a post from Microsoft that I feel you should know about

Microsoft has discovered recent activity indicating that the Raspberry Robin worm is part of a complex and interconnected malware ecosystem, with links to other malware families and alternate infection methods beyond its original USB drive spread. These infections lead to follow-on hands-on-keyboard attacks and human-operated ransomware activity. Our continuous tracking of Raspberry Robin-related activity also shows a very active operation: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint data indicates that nearly 3,000 devices in almost 1,000 organizations have seen at least one Raspberry Robin payload-related alert in the last 30 days.

Raspberry Robin has evolved from being a widely distributed worm with no observed post-infection actions when Red Canary first reported it in May 2022, to one of the largest malware distribution platforms currently active. In July 2022, Microsoft security researchers observed devices infected with Raspberry Robin being installed with the FakeUpdates malware, which led to DEV-0243 activity. DEV-0243, a ransomware-associated activity group that overlaps with actions tracked as EvilCorp by other vendors, was first observed deploying the LockBit ransomware as a service (RaaS) payload in November 2021. Since then, Raspberry Robin has also started deploying IcedID, Bumblebee, and Truebot based on our investigations.

In October 2022, Microsoft observed Raspberry Robin being used in post-compromise activity attributed to another actor, DEV-0950 (which overlaps with groups tracked publicly as FIN11/TA505). From a Raspberry Robin infection, the DEV-0950 activity led to Cobalt Strike hands-on-keyboard compromises, sometimes with a Truebot infection observed in between the Raspberry Robin and Cobalt Strike stage. The activity culminated in deployments of the Clop ransomware. DEV-0950 traditionally uses phishing to acquire the majority of their victims, so this notable shift to using Raspberry Robin enables them to deliver payloads to existing infections and move their campaigns more quickly to ransomware stages.

Given the interconnected nature of the cybercriminal economy, it’s possible that the actors behind these Raspberry Robin-related malware campaigns—usually distributed through other means like malicious ads or email—are paying the Raspberry Robin operators for malware installs.

Raspberry Robin attacks involve multi-stage intrusions, and its post-compromise activities require access to highly privileged credentials to cause widespread impact. Organizations can defend their networks from this threat by having security solutions like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Microsoft Defender Antivirus, which is built into Windows, to help detect Raspberry Robin and its follow-on activities, and by applying best practices related to credential hygiene, network segmentation, and attack surface reduction.

In this blog, we share our detailed analysis of these attacks and shed light on Raspberry Robin’s origins, since its earliest identified activity in September 2021, and motivations which have been debated since it was first reported in May 2022. We also provide mitigation guidance and other recommendations defenders can use to limit this malware’s spread and impact from follow-on hands-on-keyboard attacks.

A new worm hatches: Raspberry Robin’s initial propagation via USB drives

In early May 2022, Red Canary reported that a new worm named Raspberry Robin was spreading to Windows systems through infected USB drives. The USB drive contains a Windows shortcut (LNK) file disguised as a folder. In earlier infections, this file used a generic file name like recovery.lnk, but in more recent ones, it uses brands of USB drives. It should be noted that USB-worming malware isn’t new, and many organizations no longer track these as a top threat.  

For an attack relying on a USB drive to run malware upon insertion, the targeted system’s autorun.inf must be edited or configured to specify which code to start when the drive is plugged in. Autorun of removable media is disabled on Windows by default. However, many organizations have widely enabled it through legacy Group Policy changes.

There has been much public debate about whether the Raspberry Robin drives use autoruns to launch or if it relies purely on social engineering to encourage users to click the LNK file. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) and Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) research has confirmed that both instances exist in observed attacks. Some Raspberry Robin drives only have the LNK and executable files, while drives from earlier infections have a configured autorun.inf. This change could be linked to why the names of the shortcut files changed from more generic names to brand names of USB drives, possibly encouraging a user to execute the LNK file.

Upon insertion of the infected drive or launching of the LNK file, the UserAssist registry key in Windows—where Windows Explorer maintains a list of launched programs—is updated with a new value indicating a program was launched by Windows. 

The UserAssist key stores the names of launched programs in ROT13-ciphered format, which means that every letter in the name of the program is replaced with the 13th letter in the alphabet after it. This routine makes the entries in this registry key not immediately readable. The UserAssist key is a useful forensic artifact to demonstrate which applications were launched on Windows, as outlined in Red Canary’s blog.

Windows shortcut files are mostly used to create an easy-to-find shortcut to launch a program, such as pinning a link to a user’s browser on the taskbar. However, the format allows the launching of any code, and attackers often use LNK files to launch malicious scripts or run stored code remotely. Raspberry Robin’s LNK file points to cmd.exe to launch the Windows Installer service msiexec.exe and install a malicious payload hosted on compromised QNAP network attached storage (NAS) devices.

Once the Raspberry Robin payload is running, it spawns additional processes by using system binaries such as rundll32.exe, odbcconf.exe, and control.exe to use as living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) to run malicious code. Raspberry Robin also launches code via fodhelper.exe, a system binary for managing optional features, as a user access control (UAC) bypass.

The malware injects into system processes including regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, and dllhost.exe and connects to various command-and-control (C2) servers hosted on Tor nodes.

In most instances, Raspberry Robin persists by adding itself to the RunOnce key of the registry hive associated with the user who executed the initial malware install. The registry key points to the Raspberry Robin binary, which has a random name and a random extension such as .mh or .vdm in the user’s AppData folder or to ProgramData. The key uses the intended purpose of regsvr32.exe to launch the portable executable (PE) file, allowing the randomized non-standard file extension to launch the executable content. 

Entries in the RunOnce key delete the registry entry prior to launching the executable content at sign-in. Raspberry Robin re-adds this key once it is successfully running to ensure persistence. After the initial infection, this leads to RunOnce.exe launching the malware payload in timelines. Raspberry Robin also temporarily renames the RunOnce key when writing to it to evade detections.

Read the full article here

 A fully offensive framework to the 802.11 networks and protocols with different types of attacks for WPA/WPA2 and WEP, automated hash cracking, bluetooth hacking and much more.

Tested and supported in Kali Linux, Parrot OS and Arch Linux.

⭕ SUPPORTED ATTACKS:

• Deauthentication Attack

• Authentication Attack

• Beacon Flood Attack

• PMKID Attack

• EvilTwin Attack

• Passive/Stealthy Attack

• Pixie Dust Attack

• Null Pin Attack

• WEP Protocol Attacks

• Michael Exploitation Attack

• Jamming, Reading and Writing bluetooth connections (Not finished)

• GPS Spoofing with HackRF

⭕ FEATURES:

☑️ Descriptives attack logs

☑️ WPA/WPA2, WPS and WEP Attacks

☑️ Auto handshake cracking

☑️ Multiple templates for EvilTwin attack

☑️ Check monitor mode and its status

☑️ 2.4Ghz and 5Ghz attacks

☑️ Custom wordlist selector

☑️ Auto detect requirements

To learn more and to install go here

 Adalanche gives instant results, showing you what permissions users and groups have in an Active Directory. It is useful for visualizing and exploring who can take over accounts, machines or the entire domain, and can be used to find and show misconfigurations.

Active Directory security is notoriously difficult. Small organizations generally have no idea what they’re doing, and way too many people are just added to Domain Admins. In large organizations you have a huge number of people with different needs, and they are delegated access to varying degrees of power in the AD. At some point in time, someone makes a mistake, and that can cost you dearly.

Download

Adalanche is an all-in-one binary – it collects information from Active Directory or from local Windows machines and can the analyze the collected data. If you’re only doing AD analysis, just grab the binary for your preferred platform. Later you can deploy the dedicated collector .exe for your Windows member machines via a GPO or other orchestration and get even more insight.

Download either the latest release or the build of the latest commit from Releases. Usually running with the latest commit is fine, but there might be a problem here and there. Releases are considered stable and are for the less adventurous.

Go here to download from GitHub 

NOTICE this tool should be used only if authorized.

Is it dangerous to run adalanche?

No, it is not. Running adalanche requires nothing more than a regular user account, and works by connecting to Active Directory services and querying (reading) data from the LDAP object store, and by reading files from the SYSVOL file share (optional). This data is available to all users, and is also what attackers use to do initial reconnaissance.

Learning objectives

• Introduction1 min
• What is PowerShell?4 min
• Exercise – Run your first PowerShell commands1 min
• Locate commands3 min
• Exercise – Locate commands2 min
• Knowledge check4 min
• Summary1 min

Other sites 

 1. PowerShell tutorial for beginners – https://lnkd.in/ezsh8qE6

2. Learn PowerShell in a month of lunches –https://lnkd.in/eDCN-av6

3. PowerShell.org’s YouTube – https://lnkd.in/eAs-zExH

I will be speaking at  ChannelPro SMB Forum: Los Angeles event, which will be held
November 2-3, 2022, at the Pacific Palms Resort. 

November 2nd

November 3rd

 

Mobile Passwords–Tricks
& Treats

The NCCoE Buzz: Mobile Security Edition is a recurring email on
timely topics in mobile device cybersecurity and privacy from the National
Cybersecurity Center of Excellence’s (NCCoE’s) Mobile Device Security project
team. 

 

With Halloween around the corner, the National Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence (NCCoE) wants to share a few “tricks” and tips for mobile
passwords that result in the “treat” of protecting your mobile device from
compromise. 

Potential Threats

Below is a list of several potential mobile password threats that
can impact you or your organization:

• Lost/Stolen
  Phone – If an unauthorized user
  obtains a lost or stolen mobile phone that has no password, they may have
  easy access to sensitive information on the device (e.g., messages,
  photos, or email)
• Brute-Force
  Attack – If a mobile phone has a weak
  password, a malicious attacker may be able to easily obtain the password
  and gain access to information on the mobile phone
• Phishing – If a password is captured by texting or emailing to
  convince a user or subscriber into thinking the attacker is a verifier or
  reliable party, the attacker can gain access to a user’s account(s) and
  access sensitive information

Password Protections

To protect against mobile password threats, here are a few tips:

1. Apply multi-factor authentication.

If a password is compromised, requiring a second factor for
authentication can help protect against threats such as phishing attacks. 

Multi-factor authentication can be any combination of the
following:

• Something you know – Password, pin, etc.
• Something you have – Authenticator app, hardware token, etc.
• Something you are – Biometrics (e.g., fingerprint or face recognition)

For example, if an attacker has acquired your password (something
you know) through a phishing attack, but your account requires a password +
your fingerprint (something you are) to grant access, then the attacker will
not be able to access your account because they do not have access to the
second factor.

2. Choose a password with a minimum length of 8 characters.

A common misconception is that complexity is the key to having a
strong password. NIST SP 800-63B highlights that complexity can actually make
it difficult for the user to remember their password and can deter them from
developing a strong memorable password.

Instead, 800-63B recommends creating a memorable password that is
at least 8 characters in length to help prevent against brute-force attacks,
while also ensuring the user can remember their password/pin/passphrase.

We hope these mobile password tricks and treats were helpful.

Additional Resources

More information about how to use and apply specific
authenticators can be found in NIST Special Publication 800-63B Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management.

More information on how to protect against other potential mobile
threats can be found in NIST SP 1800-22 Mobile Device Security: Bring Your Own Device.

 

 On Nov. 1, 2022, CISA will upgrade from Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) 1.0 to
TLP 2.0 in accordance with the recommendation by the Forum of Incident Response Security Teams
(FIRST) that organizations move to 2.0 by the end of 2022. TLP Version
2.0 brings the following key updates:

• TLP:CLEAR replaces TLP:WHITE for publicly releasable
  information.
• TLP:AMBER+STRICT supplements TLP:AMBER, clarifying when
  information  may be shared with the recipient’s organization only.

CISA encourages all network defenders and partners to upgrade to TLP Version
2.0 to facilitate greater information sharing and collaboration. For more
information see:

• On
  Nov. 1, CISA Upgrades to Traffic Light Protocol 2.0 — Join Us! by
  Tom Millar, Cybersecurity Senior Advisor, CISA, and Co-chair of the FIRST
  TLP Special Interest Group (SIG)
• CISA.gov/TLP,
  which contains links to CISA’s TLP 2.0 User Guide and Fact Sheet
• FIRST.org/TLP

Back in August, the NCCoE Healthcare team released the final
project description Mitigating
Cybersecurity Risk in Telehealth Smart Home Integration.
This project’s goal is to provide health delivery organizations (HDOs) with
practical solutions for securing an ecosystem that incorporates consumer-owned
smart home devices into an HDO-managed telehealth solution.

Register now to hear an update from the NCCoE Healthcare team on
the following topics:

• The Smart Home Integration
  Project Description
• The Federal Register Notice
  (FRN) Status
• The NCCoE project approach and
  potential collaboration opportunities
• Next steps for the NCCoE
  Healthcare team

There will be 45 minutes of presentation and 15 minutes of Q&A
at the end of the webinar.

This event takes place at 2 PM today. The
event page includes details on the overview of the call as well as a link to
the registration page. If you have any questions, please email our team at [email protected].

Event
Page