NIST is introducing a plan to transition away from the current
limited use of the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) hash function. Other
approved hash functions are already available. The transition will be completed
by December 31, 2030, and NIST will engage with stakeholders throughout the
transition process. See the full
announcement for more details.
Before December 31, 2030, NIST plans to:
Publish Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-5 (a revision of FIPS 180) to remove the
SHA-1 specification,
Create and publish a transition
strategy for the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) and the
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP).
Throughout this process, NIST will actively engage with government
agencies, validation testing laboratories, vendors, Standards Developing
Organizations, sector/industry organizations, users, and other stakeholders to
minimize potential impacts and facilitate a smooth transition.
NIST encourages these entities to begin planning for this
transition now. By completing their transition before
December 31, 2030, stakeholders – particularly cryptographic module vendors –
can help minimize potential delays in the validation process.
Technologies today rely on complex, globally distributed and
interconnected supply chain ecosystems to provide reusable solutions.
Organizations are increasingly at risk of cyber supply chain compromise,
whether intentional or unintentional. Managing cyber supply chain risks
requires, in part, ensuring the integrity, quality, and resilience of the
supply chain and its products and services. This project demonstrates how
organizations can verify that the internal components of their computing
devices are genuine and have not been altered during the manufacturing or
distribution processes.
Let Us Know What You Think!
Questions? Email us at supplychain-nccoe@nist.gov
with your feedback and let us know if you would like to join the Supply Chain
Assurance community of interest. We recognize that technical solutions alone
will not fully enable the benefits of our solution, so we encourage
organizations to share lessons learned and best practices for transforming the
process associated with implementing this guide.
What’s Next
We will be hosting a community of interest webinar in February to
discuss the final practice guide and share other exciting activities. The date
and time will be announced later and we will send out another email to inform
our community of interest.
Join
this webinar to learn how new features in Azure SQL Managed Instance
provide even more flexibility to modernize your data platform on your terms
– and help you save money in the process.
Understand when SQL Managed Instance is the right
destination for your on-premises SQL Server data, and the
price-performance benefits of modernization.
Experience product demos showcasing data
virtualization, hybrid flexibility with the link feature and more.
Hear about exciting new offers that reduce your
total cost of ownership on Azure SQL.
Learn about the available tools, programs, and
support to help you get to the cloud from wherever you are in the
journey.
SQL
Managed Instance has continued to evolve as a service since its general
availability, based upon feedback we receive from our customers. If you’ve
considering modernizing your SQL Server workloads to fully managed database
services in the cloud but hesitated in the past, now is the time to move to
Azure SQL Managed Instance.
Azure webinar series Flexibility and
Performance on Azure for SQL Server Data
Thursday, December 8, 2022
10:00 AM–11:00 AM Pacific Time
The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) has
released the preliminary draft of NIST Special Publication (SP) 1800-36A:
Executive Summary, Trusted
Internet of Things (IoT) Device Network-Layer Onboarding and Lifecycle
Management. The public comment period for the draft is open
until February 3, 2023.
About the Project
Provisioning network credentials to IoT devices in an untrusted
manner leaves networks vulnerable to having unauthorized IoT devices connect to
them. It also leaves IoT devices vulnerable to being taken over by unauthorized
networks. Instead, trusted, scalable, and automatic mechanisms are needed to
safely manage IoT devices throughout their lifecycles, beginning with secure
ways to provision devices with their network credentials—a process known as trusted network-layer onboarding.
Trusted network-layer onboarding, in combination with additional device
security capabilities such as device attestation, application-layer onboarding,
secure lifecycle management, and device intent enforcement could improve the
security of networks and IoT devices.
This draft practice guide aims to demonstrate how organizations
can protect both their IoT devices and their networks. The NCCoE is
collaborating with product and service providers to produce example
implementations of trusted network-layer onboarding and capabilities that
improve device and network security throughout the IoT-device lifecycle to
achieve this.
Submit Your Comments
The public comment period for the draft is open now until February
3, 2023. See the publication details for a copy of the draft publication
and comment instructions.
The Industrial Advisory Committee will hold an open meeting
in-person and via web conference on Thursday, Dec. 8, 2022, from 9 a.m. to 3
p.m. Eastern Time. The primary purposes of this meeting are to update the
committee on the progress of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce
Semiconductors (CHIPS) Research & Development (R&D) Programs, receive
updates from the committee working groups, and allow the committee to
deliberate and discuss the progress that has been made. The final agenda will
be posted on the committee page
on the NIST website.
The meeting will be held in person and via web conference, from
the Grand Hyatt Washington Hotel, located at 1000 H St. NW, Washington,
D.C.
We have reached capacity for our in-person registration.
However, we have a registration option available to view virtually.
To view the virtual event, please submit your full name, the organization you
represent (if applicable), e-mail address, and phone number via https://events.nist.gov/profile/18507.
You may contact Tamiko Ford at Tamiko.Ford@nist.gov for more
information.
The Industrial
Advisory Committee is currently composed of 24 members, appointed
by the Secretary of Commerce, to provide advice to the United States
Government on matters relating to microelectronics research, development,
manufacturing, and policy.
Do you want to understand how you can manage multi-cloud environments with ease, then don’t miss this stream, “Overview of Entra Permissions Management.” https://lnkd.in/gAvuwYBU
Microsoft has a bunch of content around Entra Permission Management
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This increasingly common practice, known as BYOD, provides
employees with increased flexibility to telework and access organizational
information resources. Helping to ensure that an organization’s data is
protected when it is accessed from personal devices, while also protecting the
privacy needs of employees, poses unique challenges and threats.
The goal of this practice guide is to provide an example solution
that helps organizations use both a standards-based approach and commercially
available technologies to help meet their security and privacy needs when
permitting personally owned mobile devices to access enterprise resources.
Please review the second draft, which includes new updates to the
iOS BYOD implementation, and submit comments online on or before January 13th, 2023.
Visit the mobile device security page to submit your comments here.
We welcome your input and look forward to your comments. We invite
you to join our Community of Interest to receive news and updates about this
project by signing up on our website here.
Vulnerabilities in network components, architecture files, and developer tools have become increasingly popular attack vectors to gain access into secure networks and devices. External tools and products that are managed by vendors and developers can pose a security risk, especially to targets in sensitive industries. Attacks on software and hardware supply chains, likeLog4JandSolarWinds, have highlighted the importance of visibility across device components and proactively securing networks. Areportpublished by Recorded Future in April 2022 detailed suspected electrical grid intrusion activity and implicated common IoT devices as the vector used to gain a foothold into operational technology (OT) networks and deploy malicious payloads. While investigating the attack activity, Microsoft researchers identified a vulnerable component on all the IP addresses published as IOCs and found evidence of a supply chain risk that may affect millions of organizations and devices.
We assessed the vulnerable component to be the Boa web server, which is often used to access settings and management consoles and sign-in screens in devices. Despite being discontinued in 2005, the Boa web server continues to be implemented by different vendors across a variety of IoT devices and popular software development kits (SDKs). Without developers managing the Boa web server, its known vulnerabilities could allow attackers to silently gain access to networks by collecting information from files. Moreover, those affected may be unaware that their devices run services using the discontinued Boa web server, and that firmware updates and downstream patches do not address its known vulnerabilities.
In this blog, we detail the risks affiliated with vulnerable components, highlighting the Boa web server, and how we suspect these components could be exploited to target critical industries. We also discuss the difficulties with identifying these components in device supply chains. To provide comprehensive protection against such attacks, we offer detection information to identify vulnerable components and guidance for organizations and network operators to improve their security posture.
Investigating the attack activity
The attack detailed in the Recorded Future report was one of several intrusion attempts on Indian critical infrastructure since 2020, with the most recent attack on IT assets confirmed in October 2022. Microsoft assesses that Boa servers were running on the IP addresses on the list of IOCs published by Recorded Future at the time of the report’s release and that the electrical grid attack targeted exposed IoT devices running Boa.
Microsoft further identified that half of the IP addresses published by Recorded Future returned suspicious HTTP response headers, which might be associated with the active deployment of the malicious tool identified by Recorded Future. The combination of Boa and suspicious response headers was identified on another set of IP addresses, displaying similar behavior to those found by Recorded Future. While these IP addresses are not confirmed as malicious, we recommend they be monitored to ensure no additional suspicious activity. Users of Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence will find these IP addresses in the portal labeled as block-listed or suspicious:
122[.]117[.]212[.]65
103[.]58[.]93[.]133
125[.]141[.]38[.]53
14[.]45[.]33[.]239
14[.]55[.]86[.]138
183[.]108[.]133[.]29
183[.]99[.]53[.]180
220[.]94[.]133[.]121
58[.]76[.]177[.]166
Investigating the headers further indicated that over 10% of all active IP addresses returning the headers were related to critical industries, such as the petroleum industry and associated fleet services, with many of the IP addresses associated to IoT devices, such as routers, with unpatched critical vulnerabilities, highlighting an accessible attack vector for malware operators. Most of the suspicious HTTP response headers were returned over a short timeframe of several days, leading researchers to believe they may be associated with intrusion and malicious activity on networks.
Since the report’s publication, Microsoft researchers tracking the published IPs hosts have observed that all IP addresses have been compromised by a variety of attackers employing different malicious methods. For example, some of the IP addresses were further leveraged to download a variant of the Mirai malware family shortly following the report’s release. Microsoft also found evidence that across different devices on the IP addresses, there were attempts to connect with default credentials through brute force methods and attempts to run shell commands. Microsoft continues to see attackers attempting to exploit Boa vulnerabilities beyond the timeframe of the released report, indicating that it is still targeted as an attack vector.
Boa widespread through SDKs
The Boa web server is widely implemented across a variety of devices, including IoT devices ranging from routers to cameras, and is often used to access settings and management consoles as well as sign-in screens. The popularity of Boa web servers is especially concerning as Boa has been formally discontinued since 2005. Data from the Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence platform identified over 1 million internet-exposed Boa server components around the world over the span of a week, as depicted in the below figure:
Figure 1. Global mapping of internet-exposed Boa web servers on devices
Boa web servers remain pervasive in the development of IoT devices, one reason for this could be its inclusion in popular SDKs, which contain essential functions that operate system on chip (SOC) implemented in microchips. Vulnerable components like Boa and SDKs are often distributed to customers within devices, contributing to supply chain vulnerabilities. Popular SDKs like those released by RealTek, are used in SOCs provided to companies that manufacture gateway devices like routers, access points, and repeaters. Critical vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-35395, which affected the digital administration of devices using RealTek’s SDK, and CVE-2022-27255, a zero-click overflow vulnerability, reportedly affect millions of devices globally and allow attackers to launch code, compromise devices, deploy botnets, and move laterally on networks.
While patches for the RealTek SDK vulnerabilities are available, some vendors may not have included them in their device firmware updates, and the updates do not include patches for Boa vulnerabilities. Boa servers are affected by several known vulnerabilities, including arbitrary file access (CVE-2017-9833) and information disclosure (CVE-2021-33558). These vulnerabilities may allow attackers to execute code remotely after gaining device access by reading the “passwd” file from the device or accessing sensitive URIs in the web server to extract a user’s credentials. Moreover, these vulnerabilities require no authentication to exploit, making them attractive targets.
Figure 2. The IoT device supply chain demonstrates how vulnerabilities are distributed downstream to organizations and their assets
The popularity of the Boa web server displays the potential exposure risk of an insecure supply chain, even when security best practices are applied to devices in the network. Updating the firmware of IoT devices does not always patch SDKs or specific SOC components and there is limited visibility into components and whether they can be updated. The known CVEs impacting such components can allow an attacker to collect information about network assets before initiating attacks, and to gain access to a network undetected by obtaining valid credentials. In critical infrastructure networks, being able to collect information undetected prior to the attack allows the attackers to have much greater impact once the attack is initiated, potentially disrupting operations that can cost millions of dollars and affect millions of people.
Recommendations
As attackers seek new footholds into increasingly secure devices and networks, identifying and preventing distributed security risks through software and hardware supply chains, like outdated components, should be prioritized by organizations. This case displays the importance of proactive cyber security practices and the need to identify vulnerable components that may be leveraged by attackers.
Microsoft recommends that organizations and network operators follow best practice guidelines for their networks:
Patch vulnerable devices whenever possible to reduce exposure risks across your organization.
Extend vulnerability and risk detection beyond the firewall with platforms like Microsoft Defender External Attack Surface Management. Customers can identify internet-exposed infrastructure running Boa web server components in their inventory and use the insights tile under the Attack Surface Summary dashboard to surface assets vulnerable to CVE-2017-9833. The insight can be found under High Severity Observations.
Reduce the attack surface by eliminating unnecessary internet connections to IoT devices in the network. Apply network segmentation to prevent an attacker from moving laterally and compromising assets after intrusion. IoT and critical device networks should be isolated with firewalls.
Use proactive antivirus scanning to identify malicious payloads on devices.
Configure detection rules to identify malicious activity whenever possible. Security personnel can use our snort rule below to configure security solutions to detect CVE-2022-27255 on assets using the RealTek SDK.
alert udp any any -> any any (msg:"Realtek eCOS SDK SIP Traffic Exploit CVE-2022-27255"; content: "invite"; depth: 6; nocase; content: "sip:"; content: "m=audio "; isdataat: 128,relative; content:!"|0d|"; within: 128;sid:20221031;)
Adopt a comprehensive IoT and OT solution like Microsoft Defender for IoT to monitor devices, respond to threats, and increase visibility in order to detect and alert when IoT devices with Boa are used as an entry point to a network and protect critical infrastructure.
