Author: blogmirnet

Example of invoice attachment. Image Source: Wallarm Labs

Consistent with open-source reporting, the NJCCIC’s email security solution detected increased attempts to exploit DocuSign APIs to deliver fraudulent invoices. Unlike traditional phishing scams, which rely on misleading emails and links, these attacks use real DocuSign accounts and templates to mimic reputable companies, making detection more difficult.

The threat actor creates a legitimate DocuSign account to manipulate templates and use the company’s API. They craft templates that mimic e-sign requests from recognizable brands like Norton Antivirus. These invoices may include real product pricing and additional fees, such as a $50 activation charge. If users e-sign, the threat actor may demand payment directly from the organization or forward the signed document to the finance department. Other observed attempts involve invoices designed to authorize payments sent directly to the threat actor’s bank account. Because these invoices are sent through DocuSign, they can bypass spam filters, appear authentic, and do not require the use of malicious links or attachments.

Over the past five months, there has been an increase in reports of these malicious campaigns, and discussions about fraudulent activities have surged on DocuSign’s community forums. These reports reveal a concerning trend in which the threat actors are not only impersonating legitimate companies but are also infiltrating official communication channels to carry out these schemes. The discussions in DocuSign’s community forums indicate that these incidents are not isolated, manual attacks; rather, they appear to be systematic operations that require automation. A threat actor can send out large volumes of fraudulent invoices with minimal manual intervention utilizing resources like the Envelopes: create API.

Recommendations

Avoid clicking links, responding to, or otherwise acting on unsolicited emails. Confirm requests from senders via contact information obtained from verified and official sources. Keep systems up to date and apply patches after appropriate testing. Implement cybersecurity best practices to reduce risk and increase resiliency to cyber threats. Utilize monitoring and detection solutions to identify suspicious login attempts and user behavior. Conduct continuous monitoring and threat hunting. Ingest techniques found in the Wallarm article into endpoint security solutions. Consider leveraging behavior-based detection tools rather than signature-based tools. Report phishing and other malicious cyber activity to the FBI’s IC3 and the NJCCIC.

Image Source: LastPass

LastPass Password Manager warned customers about a new social engineering campaign in which threat actors are leaving five-star reviews, posing as support on the LastPass extension review page on Google Chrome. In these reviews, they provide customers with a phone number to contact for help resolving potential issues.

If contacted, users connect with someone claiming to support LastPass. They ask the user about their support issue, how they access LastPass, and which operating system they use. Once they gather the basic information, the threat actors direct their target to dghelp[.]top to enter a code to download a ConnectWise ScreenConnect agent, which gives the threat actors access to the target’s computer. While the user is still engaged with the call, the scammer can install other malicious infostealing software.

Image Source: BleepingComputer

Researchers have found the phony support phone number 805-206-2892 associated with this scam to be linked to a larger campaign involving several other companies, including Adobe, Amazon, Capital One, Netflix, and Verizon. In some instances, the fake support number has not been limited to Chrome extension reviews and has been posted on other sites, including brand forums and Reddit.

While this campaign has primarily affected Google Chrome users, researchers have recently identified a scam targeting users through Microsoft Bing’s search engine. Users searching for “Keybank login” will yield a malicious copycat page as the top result. This credential harvesting scam appears to abuse Bing’s search algorithm to appear above the official website in the search engine result pages.

Recommendations

Exercise caution with information found in comments and reviews, even if it appears to originate from legitimate sources. Confirm contact information from verified and official sources. Submit account credentials only on official websites. Download applications only from official sources. Promptly uninstall affected apps. Immediately change credentials used to log into malicious apps.

This Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Advisory is being provided to assist agencies, organizations, and individuals in guarding against the persistent malicious actions of cybercriminals.

A vulnerability has been discovered in Google Android that could allow for remote code execution. Android is an operating system developed by Google for mobile devices, including, but not limited to, smartphones, tablets, and watches. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow for remote code execution in the context of the logged-on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.

Threat Intelligence Google reports that CVE-2024-43093 has been exploited in the wild.

Systems Affected

Android OS Patch levels prior to 2024-11-01

Risk Government: – Large and medium government entities: High – Small government entities: Medium

Businesses: – Large and medium business entities: High – Small business entities: Medium

Home Users: Low

Technical Summary A vulnerability has been discovered in Google Android that could allow for remote code execution.

Recommendations

Apply appropriate mitigations provided by Google to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. Remind users not to visit untrusted websites or follow links provided by unknown or untrusted sources. Inform and educate users regarding threats posed by hypertext links contained in emails or attachments, especially from untrusted sources. Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.

Reference Google: https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2024-11-01

Individuals, who are enrolled in the Identity Theft Protection program offered by LifeLock, are receiving notifications in error by LifeLock. These notifications are being sent by email or text stating “New Property Report Detected.” It is an issue with LifeLock’s system. They are aware of the problem and are actively working to resolve the issue. No further action is required; however, if you have any questions or concerns, please refer to Norton’s Help Center at https://support.norton.com/sp/en/us/home/current/help-center or contact LifeLock’s customer service directly at 1-800-543-3562.

The initial public draft of NIST Internal Report (IR) 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, is now available for public comment.

This report describes NIST’s expected approach to transitioning from quantum-vulnerable cryptographic algorithms to post-quantum digital signature algorithms and key-establishment schemes. It identifies existing quantum-vulnerable cryptographic standards and the current quantum-resistant standards that will be used in the migration. This report should inform the efforts and timelines of federal agencies, industry, and standards organizations for migrating information technology products, services, and infrastructure to PQC. Comments received on this draft will be used to revise this transition plan and feed into other algorithm- and application-specific guidance for the transition to PQC. 

The public comment period is open through January 10, 2025. See the publication details for a copy of the draft and instructions for submitting comments.

NOTE: A call for patent claims is included on page ii of this draft. For additional information, see the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Patent Policy – Inclusion of Patents in ITL Publications.

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Image Source: Proofpoint

The NJCCIC email security system has uncovered a new campaign spreading XLoader and GuLoader malware. XLoader is a successor to Formbook infostealing malware and is categorized as malware-as-a-service (MaaS). XLoader has several capabilities, such as capturing screenshots, recording keystrokes, and accessing information stored on the clipboard. Additionally, it can steal credentials from browsers, email accounts, and messaging applications. GuLoader is a malware downloader that often utilizes Google Drive for payload storage. GuLoader allows for multiple download locations to establish redundancy.

In this campaign, threat actors send emails containing compressed executable files. These messages purport to be sent from a generic HR administrator and claim that the attached staff attendance form must be completed by a specified deadline; otherwise, payments will not be processed. If users open and run the compressed executables, GuLoader and XLoader begin to install on the device.

Recommendations

Avoid clicking links and opening attachments in unsolicited emails. Confirm requests from senders via contact information obtained from verified and official sources. Type official website URLs into browsers manually. Facilitate user awareness training to include these types of phishing-based techniques. Maintain robust and up-to-date endpoint detection tools on every endpoint. Consider leveraging behavior-based detection tools rather than signature-based tools.

The final public drafts (fpd) of NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-157r1 (Revision 1), Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials, and SP 800-217, Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Federation, are now available for public review and comment. 

• SP 800-157r1 fpd details the expanded set of derived PIV credentials in a variety of form factors and authenticator types, as envisioned in OMB Memoranda M-19-17 and M-22-09 and subsequently outlined in FIPS 201-3.
• SP 800-217 fpd details the cross-domain and interagency use of the derived PIV credentials using federation protocols.

Both guidelines address the comments received on the 2023 initial public drafts and align with the recently published second public draft of SP 800-63-4, Digital Identity Guidelines.

The public comment period for both final drafts are open through January 10, 2025. See the publication details for SP 800-157r1 and SP 800-217 to download the drafts and find instructions for submitting comments. Comments should be submitted to [email protected]. Reviewers are encouraged to comment on all or parts of the publications using the comment template that is available on the publication details page. Comments received in response to this request will be posted online after the due date. Submitters’ names and affiliations (when provided) will be included, while contact information will be removed. Please direct questions and comments to [email protected].

Read SP 800-157r1

Read SP 800-217

NIST maintains its cryptography standards and guidelines using a periodic review process.

NIST requests public comments on all aspects of NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-102, Recommendation for Digital Signature Timeliness, 2009.

This publication discusses the use of timestamps to establish the time when a digital signature was generated. The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program does not test for conformance with this publication. NIST is interested in learning how widely (or not) this recommendation is currently implemented and what Trusted Timestamp Authorities are being used.

Note that two other publications have been developed that also address the use of timestamps: American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9.95 (Trusted Time Stamp Management and Security) and ISO/IEC 18014 (Time-stamping Services).

The public comment period is open through January 14, 2025. Send comments to [email protected] with “Comments on SP 800-102” in the subject line.

Comments received in response to this request will be posted on the Crypto Publication Review Project site after the due date. Submitters’ names and affiliations (when provided) will be included, while contact information will be removed. See the project site for additional information about the review process.

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OVERVIEW:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Palo Alto PAN-OS, the most severe of which could allow for authentication bypass. PAN-OS is the software that runs all Palo Alto Networks next-generation firewalls. Successful exploitation could allow for authentication bypass with administrator privileges. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data.

THREAT INTELLEGENCE:

Palo Alto Networks has identified threat activity targeting a limited number of device management web interfaces. This activity has primarily originated from IP addresses known to proxy/tunnel traffic for anonymous VPN services.

SYSTEMS AFFECTED:

• PAN-OS 11.2 < 11.2.4-h1
• PAN-OS 11.1 < 11.1.5-h1
• PAN-OS 11.0 < 11.0.6-h1
• PAN-OS 10.2 < 10.2.12-h2
• PAN-OS 10.1 < 10.1.14-h6

RISK:
Government:

• Large and medium government entities: High
• Small government entities: Medium 

Businesses:

• Large and medium business entities: High
• Small business entities: Medium 

Home users: Low 

TECHNICAL SUMMARY:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Palo Alto PAN-OS, the most severe of which could allow for authentication bypass. Details of these vulnerabilities are as follows: 

Tactic: Initial Access (TA0001):

Technique: Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190):

• An authentication bypass in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the management web interface to gain PAN-OS administrator privileges to perform administrative actions, tamper with the configuration, or exploit other authenticated privilege escalation vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-9474. The risk of this issue is greatly reduced if you secure access to the management web interface by restricting access to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines. (CVE-2024-0012)
• A privilege escalation vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software allows a PAN-OS administrator with access to the management web interface to perform actions on the firewall with root privileges. (CVE-2024-9474)

Successful exploitation could allow for authentication bypass with administrator privileges. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data. 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We recommend the following actions be taken:

• Apply appropriate updates provided by Ivanti to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. (M1051: Update Software)
  • Safeguard 7.1 : Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process: Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.
  • Safeguard 7.2: Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process: Establish and maintain a risk-based remediation strategy documented in a remediation process, with monthly, or more frequent, reviews.
  • Safeguard 7.4: Perform Automated Application Patch Management: Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.
  • Safeguard 7.5 : Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Internal Enterprise Assets: Perform automated vulnerability scans of internal enterprise assets on a quarterly, or more frequent, basis. Conduct both authenticated and unauthenticated scans, using a SCAP-compliant vulnerability scanning tool.
  • Safeguard 7.7: Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities: Remediate detected vulnerabilities in software through processes and tooling on a monthly, or more frequent, basis, based on the remediation process.
  • Safeguard 12.1: Ensure Network Infrastructure is Up-to-Date: Ensure network infrastructure is kept up-to-date. Example implementations include running the latest stable release of software and/or using currently supported network-as-a-service (NaaS) offerings. Review software versions monthly, or more frequently, to verify software support.
  • Safeguard 18.1: Establish and Maintain a Penetration Testing Program: Establish and maintain a penetration testing program appropriate to the size, complexity, and maturity of the enterprise. Penetration testing program characteristics include scope, such as network, web application, Application Programming Interface (API), hosted services, and physical premise controls; frequency; limitations, such as acceptable hours, and excluded attack types; point of contact information; remediation, such as how findings will be routed internally; and retrospective requirements.
  • Safeguard 18.2: Perform Periodic External Penetration Tests: Perform periodic external penetration tests based on program requirements, no less than annually. External penetration testing must include enterprise and environmental reconnaissance to detect exploitable information. Penetration testing requires specialized skills and experience and must be conducted through a qualified party. The testing may be clear box or opaque box.
  • Safeguard 18.3: Remediate Penetration Test Findings: Remediate penetration test findings based on the enterprise’s policy for remediation scope and prioritization.
    ​​​​​​ 
• Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. (M1026: Privileged Account Management)
  • Safeguard 4.7: Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software: Manage default accounts on enterprise assets and software, such as root, administrator, and other pre-configured vendor accounts. Example implementations can include: disabling default accounts or making them unusable.
  • Safeguard 5.5: Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Accounts: Establish and maintain an inventory of service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, must contain department owner, review date, and purpose. Perform service account reviews to validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.
    ​​​​​​
• Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them. (M1016: Vulnerability Scanning)
  • Safeguard 16.13: Conduct Application Penetration Testing: Conduct application penetration testing. For critical applications, authenticated penetration testing is better suited to finding business logic vulnerabilities than code scanning and automated security testing. Penetration testing relies on the skill of the tester to manually manipulate an application as an authenticated and unauthenticated user.
     
• Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. (M1030: Network Segmentation)
  • Safeguard 12.2: Establish and Maintain a Secure Network Architecture: Establish and maintain a secure network architecture. A secure network architecture must address segmentation, least privilege, and availability, at a minimum.
     
• Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring. (M1050: Exploit Protection)
  • Safeguard 10.5:  Enable Anti-Exploitation Features: Enable anti-exploitation features on enterprise assets and software, where possible, such as Microsoft® Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Windows® Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG), or Apple® System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper™.

REFERENCES:

Palo Alto:
https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-9474
https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-0012

CVE:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-9474
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-0012

This Joint Cybersecurity Advisory is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.   The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to disseminate known BianLian ransomware and data extortion group indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) identified through FBI and ASD’S ACSC investigations.   This advisory, originally published in May, has been updated with additional TTPs obtained as of June through FBI and ASD’S ACSC investigations and industry threat intelligence.   The reporting agencies are aware of multiple ransomware groups, like BianLian, that seek to misattribute location and nationality by choosing foreign-language names, almost certainly to complicate attribution efforts. BianLian is a ransomware developer, deployer, and data extortion cybercriminal group, likely based in Russia, with multiple Russia-based affiliates.   BianLian group actors have affected organizations in multiple US critical infrastructure sectors since June 2022. They have also targeted Australian critical infrastructure sectors in addition to professional services and property development. The group gains access to victim systems through valid Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, uses open-source tools and command-line scripting for discovery and credential harvesting, and exfiltrates victim data via File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Rclone, or Mega. BianLian then extorts money by threatening to release data if payment is not made. BianLian group originally employed a double-extortion model in which they encrypted victims’ systems after exfiltrating the data; however, they shifted primarily to exfiltration-based extortion around January 2023 and shifted to exclusively exfiltration-based extortion around January 2024.   FBI, CISA, and ASD’S ACSC encourage critical infrastructure organizations and small- and medium-sized organizations to implement the recommendations in the mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of BianLian and other ransomware and data extortion incidents.