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Mitigating Email Based Threats

Yesterday, the NJCCIC released an advisory, Increase in Compromised NJ Public Sector Accounts. Common threads observed in these incidents are a lack of or misconfigured Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) records. Without these email security protocols, organizations are more at risk of phishing campaigns and impersonation scams. As a follow-up to the advisory, please review the two guides below on creating and publishing an SPF record and implementing DMARC. The NJCCIC highly advises following these guides to increase email security at your organizations.

Sender Policy Framework – SPF Guide
Why is SPF important?
SPF records, when established along with DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to implement DMARC, create a policy of quarantine or reject to prevent email spoofing. On its own, SPF records can prevent an unauthorized sending host from sending messages using the envelop sender’s domain. It can also improve email deliverability as domains with SPF records are more trusted.

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance – DMARC Guide
Why is DMARC important?
DMARC helps organizations prevent malicious email practices, like domain spoofing. Cyber threat actors often use domain spoofing in their phishing campaigns as it can be used to make messages appear as though they are sent from known and trusted organizations and individuals. DMARC helps senders and receivers work together to safeguard email and reduce instances of spoofing, phishing, and spam. It provides an extra layer of security to identify spammers and prevent malicious emails from overwhelming an organization’s mailboxes while minimizing false positives. Additionally, DMARC offers improved authentication reporting for greater transparency.

Reporting
The NJCCIC encourages recipients who discover signs of malicious cyber activity to contact the NJCCIC via the cyber incident report form at www.cyber.nj.gov/report.

Critical Patches Issued for Microsoft Products, December 9, 2025 – PATCH NOW

Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Microsoft products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution. Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker gaining the same privileges as the logged-on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.

THREAT INTELLIGENCE:
There are currently no reports of this vulnerability being exploited in the wild.

SYSTEMS AFFECTED:

Windows PowerShell
Windows Projected File System
Windows Storage VSP Driver
Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver
Microsoft Edge for iOS
Windows Message Queuing
Windows Resilient File System (ReFS)
Windows Win32K – GRFX
Windows Projected File System Filter Driver
Windows DirectX
Windows Client-Side Caching (CSC) Service
Windows Defender Firewall Service
Microsoft Brokering File System
Windows Common Log File System Driver
Windows Remote Access Connection Manager
Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS)
Azure Monitor Agent
Microsoft Office Access
Microsoft Office Excel
Microsoft Office
Microsoft Office Word
Microsoft Office Outlook
Windows Shell
Windows Hyper-V
Windows Camera Frame Server Monitor
Windows Installer
Application Information Services
Microsoft Exchange Server
Microsoft Graphics Component
Copilot
Microsoft Office SharePoint
Storvsp.sys Driver
Windows DWM Core Library

RISK:
Government:

Large and medium government entities: High
Small government entities: Medium

Businesses:

Large and medium business entities: High
Small business entities: Medium

Home users: Low

TECHNICAL SUMMARY:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Microsoft products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution.

A full list of all vulnerabilities can be found in the Microsoft link in the Reference section.

Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker gaining the same privileges as the logged-on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
We recommend the following actions be taken:

Apply appropriate updates provided by Microsoft to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. (M1051: Update Software)
- Safeguard 7.1 : Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process: Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.
- Safeguard 7.2: Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process: Establish and maintain a risk-based remediation strategy documented in a remediation process, with monthly, or more frequent, reviews.
- Safeguard 7.4: Perform Automated Application Patch Management: Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.
- Safeguard 7.5 : Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Internal Enterprise Assets: Perform automated vulnerability scans of internal enterprise assets on a quarterly, or more frequent, basis. Conduct both authenticated and unauthenticated scans, using a SCAP-compliant vulnerability scanning tool.
- Safeguard 7.7: Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities: Remediate detected vulnerabilities in software through processes and tooling on a monthly, or more frequent, basis, based on the remediation process.
- Safeguard 12.1: Ensure Network Infrastructure is Up-to-Date: Ensure network infrastructure is kept up-to-date. Example implementations include running the latest stable release of software and/or using currently supported network-as-a-service (NaaS) offerings. Review software versions monthly, or more frequently, to verify software support.
- Safeguard 18.1: Establish and Maintain a Penetration Testing Program: Establish and maintain a penetration testing program appropriate to the size, complexity, and maturity of the enterprise. Penetration testing program characteristics include scope, such as network, web application, Application Programming Interface (API), hosted services, and physical premise controls; frequency; limitations, such as acceptable hours, and excluded attack types; point of contact information; remediation, such as how findings will be routed internally; and retrospective requirements.
- Safeguard 18.2: Perform Periodic External Penetration Tests: Perform periodic external penetration tests based on program requirements, no less than annually. External penetration testing must include enterprise and environmental reconnaissance to detect exploitable information. Penetration testing requires specialized skills and experience and must be conducted through a qualified party. The testing may be clear box or opaque box.
- Safeguard 18.3: Remediate Penetration Test Findings: Remediate penetration test findings based on the enterprise’s policy for remediation scope and prioritization.

Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. (M1026: Privileged Account Management)
- Safeguard 4.7: Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software: Manage default accounts on enterprise assets and software, such as root, administrator, and other pre-configured vendor accounts. Example implementations can include: disabling default accounts or making them unusable.
- Safeguard 5.5: Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Accounts: Establish and maintain an inventory of service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, must contain department owner, review date, and purpose. Perform service account reviews to validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.

Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them. (M1016: Vulnerability Scanning)
- Safeguard 16.13: Conduct Application Penetration Testing: Conduct application penetration testing. For critical applications, authenticated penetration testing is better suited to finding business logic vulnerabilities than code scanning and automated security testing. Penetration testing relies on the skill of the tester to manually manipulate an application as an authenticated and unauthenticated user.

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. (M1030: Network Segmentation)
- Safeguard 12.2: Establish and Maintain a Secure Network Architecture: Establish and maintain a secure network architecture. A secure network architecture must address segmentation, least privilege, and availability, at a minimum.

Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring. (M1050: Exploit Protection)
- Safeguard 10.5: Enable Anti-Exploitation Features: Enable anti-exploitation features on enterprise assets and software, where possible, such as Microsoft® Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Windows® Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG), or Apple® System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper™.

REFERENCES:

Microsoft:
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2025-Dec

Updated Draft Guidelines for National Checklist Program for IT Products

Available for Public Comment—National Checklist Program for IT Products: Guidelines for Checklist Users and Developers

NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-70r5 ipd (Revision 5, initial public draft), National Checklist Program for IT Products – Guidelines for Checklist Users and Developers, is now available for public comment through January 16, 2026, at 11:59 PM (EST).

NIST established the National Checklist Program (NCP) to facilitate the generation of security checklists from authoritative sources, centralize the location of checklists, and make checklists broadly accessible. SP 800-70r5 ipd describes the uses, benefits, and management of checklists and checklist control catalogs, as well as the policies, procedures, and general requirements for participation in the NCP.

Why Security Configuration Checklists Matter

A security configuration checklist is a document or technical content that contains instructions or procedures for securely configuring an IT product to match an operational environment’s risk tolerance, verifying that the product has been configured properly, and/or identifying unauthorized changes to the product. Using these checklists can minimize the attack surface, reduce vulnerabilities, lessen the impacts of successful attacks, and identify changes that might otherwise go undetected.

What’s New in Revision 5?

This revision introduces significant updates to improve usability, automation, and alignment with modern cybersecurity practices.

Key Highlights

Traceability and Compliance: Enhanced mapping concepts between checklist settings, NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 outcomes, SP 800-53 controls, and Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) identifiers for evidence-ready automation and reporting
Expanded Coverage: Guidance that includes cloud platforms, IoT, and AI systems and reflects the latest NIST research and federal requirements
Modernized Automation: Explicit support for a wide range of automated checklist formats
Control Catalog Approach: Encourages developers to use catalogs of controls for rapid, consistent checklist generation and easier tailoring to different risk postures
Operational Environment Tailoring: Detailed recommendations for customizing checklists to fit stand-alone, managed (enterprise), specialized security-limited functionality (SSLF), and legacy environments
Checklist Life Cycle: Clear procedures for checklist development, testing, documentation, submission, public review, maintenance, and archival

Intended Audience

This document is intended for users and developers of security configuration.

For checklist users, this document makes recommendations on how they should select checklists from the NIST National Checklist Repository, evaluate and test checklists, and apply them to IT products.
For checklist developers, this document sets forth the policies, procedures, and general requirements for participation in the NCP.

Submit Comments

The comment period for SP 800-70r5 ipd is open through January 16, 2026, at 11:59 PM (EST). Email comments to: checklists@nist.gov.

Read the Publication

Vulnerability in React Server Component Could Allow for Remote Code Execution

This Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Advisory is being provided to assist agencies and organizations in guarding against the persistent malicious actions of cybercriminals.

A vulnerability in the React Server Components (RSC) implementation has been discovered that could allow for remote code execution. Specifically, it could allow for unauthenticated remote code execution on affected servers. The issue stems from unsafe deserialization of RSC “Flight” protocol payloads, enabling an attacker to send a crafted request that triggers execution of code on the server. This is now being called, “React2Shell” by security researchers.

Threat Intelligence

Active exploitation has been reported in the wild, specifically by Chinese threat actor groups.

Systems Affected

React Server Components – all versions prior to React 19.0.1, 19.1.2, and 19.2.1 Next.js 15.x – all versions prior to the patched 15.x release Next.js 16.x – all versions prior to the patched 16.x release Any frameworks or tools that bundle React Server Components prior to the patched React versions

Risk

Government:
– Large and medium government entities: High
– Small government entities: Medium

Businesses:
– Large and medium business entities: High
– Small business entities: Medium

Home Users: Low

Recommendations

Apply appropriate updates provided by React to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. Use vulnerability scanning to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them. Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.

Charting the Course for NIST OSCAL: NIST CSWP 53 is Available for Public Comment

The initial public draft of NIST Cybersecurity White Paper (CSWP) 53, Charting the Course for NIST OSCAL, is available for public comment. This paper introduces the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL) — an open-source, machine-readable language that standardizes security documentation for better monitoring and risk management.

OSCAL was developed to modernize manual, paper-based cybersecurity compliance through automated, scalable processes and continuous assessments. This draft describes OSCAL’s layered architecture, its growing global adoption, and its future integration with emerging technologies (e.g., digital twins, agentic AI) for autonomous risk reasoning and continuous assurance.

The public comment period is open through January 13, 2026. See the publication details for a copy of the draft and instructions for submitting comments.

Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology

Since the public release of ChatGPT in November 2022, artificial intelligence (AI) has been integrated into many facets of human society. For critical infrastructure owners and operators, AI can potentially be used to increase efficiency and productivity, enhance decision-making, save costs, and improve customer experience. Despite the many benefits, integrating AI into operational technology (OT) environments that manage essential public services also introduces significant risks—such as OT process models drifting over time or safety-process bypasses—that owners and operators must carefully manage to ensure the availability and reliability of critical infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre, in collaboration with Federal and International partners, have released Cybersecurity Guidance which provides critical infrastructure owners and operators with practical information for integrating AI into OT environments. This guidance outlines four key principles critical infrastructure owners and operators can follow to leverage the benefits of AI in OT systems while reducing risk.

The authoring agencies encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to review this guidance and action the principles so they can safely and securely integrate AI into OT systems.

Please do not hesitate to contact the NJCCIC at njccic@cyber.nj.gov with any questions. Also, for more background on our recent cybersecurity efforts, please visit cyber.nj.gov.

NICE Releases NICE Framework Components v2.1.0

PRC State-Sponsored Actors Use BRICKSTORM Malware Across Public Sector and Information Technology Systems

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is aware of ongoing intrusions by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors using BRICKSTORM malware for long-term persistence on victim systems. BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor for VMware vSphere and Windows environments. Victim organizations are primarily in the Government Services and Facilities and Information Technology Sectors. BRICKSTORM enables cyber actors to maintain stealthy access and provides capabilities for initiation, persistence, and secure command and control. The malware employs advanced functionality, including multiple layers of encryption (e.g., HTTPS, WebSockets, and nested TLS), DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to conceal communications, and a SOCKS proxy to facilitate lateral movement and tunneling within victim networks. BRICKSTORM also incorporates long-term persistence mechanisms, such as a self-monitoring function that automatically reinstalls or restarts the malware if disrupted, ensuring its continued operation.

The initial access vector varies. In one confirmed compromise, PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors accessed a web server inside the organization’s demilitarized zone (DMZ), moved laterally to an internal VMware vCenter server, then implanted BRICKSTORM malware. See CISA, the National Security Agency, and Canadian Cyber Security Centre’s (Cyber Centre’s) Joint Malware Analysis Report (MAR) BRICKSTORM Backdoor for analysis of the BRICKSTORM sample CISA obtained during an incident response engagement for this victim. The MAR also discusses seven additional BRICKSTORM samples, which exhibit variations in functionality and capabilities, further highlighting the complexity and adaptability of this malware.

After obtaining access to victim systems, PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors obtain and use legitimate credentials by performing system backups or capturing Active Directory database information to exfiltrate sensitive information. Cyber threat actors then target VMware vSphere platforms to steal cloned virtual machine (VM) snapshots for credential extraction and create hidden rogue VMs to evade detection.

CISA recommends network defenders hunt for existing intrusions and mitigate further compromise by taking the following actions:

Scan for BRICKSTORM using CISA-created YARA and Sigma rules, found in the joint (MAR) BRICKSTORM Backdoor. Block unauthorized DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers and external DoH network traffic to reduce unmonitored communications. Take inventory of all network edge devices and monitor for any suspicious network connectivity originating from these devices. Ensure proper network segmentation that restricts network traffic from the DMZ to the internal network.

Beware of Fraudulent Digital Asset Purchases

The NJCCIC observed multiple Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery (TOAD) campaigns targeting New Jersey State employees that purported to be legitimate notifications for purchases of digital assets or currencies. In one campaign, the email content lacks relevant context to the subject line phrases, such as “new log needs confirmation” or “update waiting for review.” The emails come from suspicious domains or out-of-country top-level domains (TLDs) and may contain an Adobe PDF attachment detailing the PayPal purchase. Another red flag is a purchase notification that is not personalized but sent to multiple recipients. Threat actors may add recipients in the “Bcc” field to appear more legitimate or circumvent some security filters that might identify emails sent to an extensive list in the “To” or “Cc” fields. In this campaign, threat actors create urgency by including a phone number if the target requires immediate assistance within the next 24 hours to dispute the “590.99$ USD” PayPal transaction. If the target calls the phone number, the threat actors impersonating a security team representative convince them to divulge sensitive information, such as account credentials or financial details, or download malicious software or a supposed remote support tool, which enables the threat actors to gain access to the device.

In a similar TOAD campaign, the subject line displays “your digital shield is now operational” and lacks relevant context to the email, which claims to be a Bitcoin purchase of “348.87 USD” via PayPal. The fraudulent transaction is part of an automated recurring purchase program or a monthly subscription. Threat actors provide a phone number for the target to cancel future automatic purchases or make changes within 24 hours.

In a separate campaign, the emails claim to be a Bitcoin purchase awaiting approval due to a previous transaction of “USD 767.69” reaching the maximum approved limit for a 24-hour period. They also include a billing support phone number for the target to call if they require assistance or wish to review the transaction details. Additionally, the fraudulent emails are disguised as WordPress notifications from the legitimate “comment-reply[@]wordpress[.]com” email address that facilitates blog comment notification and reply features. The threat actors abuse this service, hoping that their target will respond to the “posted” fraudulent purchase, either by calling the phone number or replying as a comment.

Recommendations

Refrain from clicking links, opening attachments, responding to, or acting on communications from unknown senders.

Exercise caution with unsolicited communications from known senders or legitimate platforms. Scrutinize messages, especially those with urgent language or confirmation of updates, changes, or requests.

Confirm messages from senders by verifying their contact information obtained from trusted and official sources before taking action, such as clicking on links or opening attachments.

Type official website URLs into browsers manually and only submit account credentials, personal information, or financial details on official websites.

Refrain from downloading or installing software from unknown sources. Keep systems and browsers up to date.

Monitor accounts and statements for any unauthorized activity.

Report malicious cyber activity to the NJCCIC and the FBI’s IC3.

Upcoming NIST Webinar: Resources for Ransomware Risk Management

Date: January 28, 2026

Time: 2:00-3:00PM ET

Ransomware is a persistent risk to organizations of all sizes and sectors, and addressing this risk requires collaboration across the public and private sectors to develop practical resources for organizations to reduce their ransomware risks.

Speakers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Center for Internet Security (CIS), and the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) will provide an overview of available ransomware risk management resources that help organizations get started with ransomware risk management by establishing foundational safeguards and building from there. Two resources that will be featured include:

NIST Ransomware Risk Management CSF 2.0 Community Profile—published as an Initial Public Draft on January 13, 2025, reflects changes made to the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) from CSF 1.1 to CSF 2.0 which identifies security objectives that support managing, detecting, responding to, and recovering from ransomware events. The publication can be used to gauge an organization’s readiness to counter ransomware threats, mitigate potential consequences of a ransomware event, and to develop a ransomware countermeasure playbook.
The IST and the Ransomware Task Force Blueprint for Ransomware Defense—which provides small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with an actionable framework to defend against the most common attacks. It is comprised of a subset of Implementation Group 1 (IG1) Safeguards from the CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls) v8 and aligned with NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, to help SMEs understand where they can get started with establishing a ransomware risk management strategy.

Speakers will provide an overview of the resources above, including how they were developed collaboratively, and will also discuss current and future efforts to address ransomware risk management. Ample time will be saved audience questions, ideas, and discussion.

Speakers:

Bill Fisher, Security Engineer, NIST
Valecia Stocchetti, Senior Cybersecurity Engineer, CIS Critical Security Controls
Michael Klein, Senior Director for Preparedness and Response, Institute for Security and Technology (IST)
Moderator: Daniel Eliot, Lead for Small Business Engagement, NIST