Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Fortinet products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution. Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could allow for remote code execution in the context of the affected service account. Depending on the privileges associated with the service account, threat actors could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Service accounts that are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.
Threat Intelligence
Fortinet is aware that CVE-2025-25256 has been exploited in the wild.
Systems Affected
FortiSIEM 5.4 all versions FortiSIEM 6.1 all versions FortiSIEM 6.2 all versions FortiSIEM 6.3 all versions FortiSIEM 6.4 all versions FortiSIEM 6.5 all versions FortiSIEM 6.6 all versions FortiSIEM 6.7.0 through 6.7.9 FortiSIEM 7.0.0 through 7.0.3 FortiSIEM 7.1.0 through 7.1.7 FortiSIEM 7.2.0 through 7.2.5 FortiSIEM 7.3.0 through 7.3.1 FortiManager 6.2 all versions FortiManager 6.4 all versions FortiManager 7.0.0 through 7.0.13 FortiManager 7.2.0 through 7.2.9 FortiManager 7.4.0 through 7.4.5 FortiManager 7.6.0 through 7.6.1 FortiManager Cloud 6.4 all versions FortiManager Cloud 7.0.1 through 7.0.13 FortiManager Cloud 7.2.1 through 7.2.9 FortiManager Cloud 7.4.1 through 7.4.5 FortiOS 6.0 all versions FortiOS 6.2.0 through 6.2.16 FortiOS 6.4 all versions FortiOS 7.0 all versions FortiOS 7.2 all versions FortiOS 7.4.0 FortiOS 7.4.0 through 7.4.7 FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.2 FortiPAM 1.0 all versions FortiPAM 1.1 all versions FortiPAM 1.2 all versions FortiPAM 1.3 all versions FortiPAM 1.4.0 through 1.4.2 FortiPAM 1.5.0FortiProxy 2.0 all versions FortiProxy 7.0 all versions FortiProxy 7.2 all versions FortiProxy 7.4.0 through 7.4.1 FortiProxy 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 FortiProxy 7.4.0 through 7.4.3 FortiProxy 7.6.0 through 7.6.2 FortiSwitchManager 7.0.0 through 7.0.3 FortiSwitchManager 7.2.0 through 7.2.3
Risk
Government: – Large and medium government entities: High – Small government entities: Medium
Businesses: – Large and medium business entities: High – Small business entities: Medium
Home Users: Low
Recommendations
Apply the stable channel update provided by Fortinet to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. Use vulnerability scanning to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them. Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring. Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
Portable storage media can be used to transfer data physically to and from OT environments. USB storage devices are convenient, but their use poses potential cybersecurity risks for organizations that utilize them in their OT environments. Organizations can reduce these risks with secure physical and logical controls on the access, storage, and usage of USB devices.
The NCCoE created an OT Security Series to provide simplified guidance that will assist organizations in securing their OT systems.
If you have any comments about this paper, and/or recommendations for additional topics that the OT Security Series could cover, please reach out to the NCCoE Manufacturing team via manufacturing_nccoe@nist.gov.
Cybersecurity Insights a NIST Blog Let’s get Digital! Updated Digital Identity Guidelines are Here. NIST just released Special Publication 800-63, Digital Identity Guidelines, Revision 4, which intends to respond to the changing digital landscape that has emerged since the last major revision of this suite was published by NIST in 2017.
The new guidelines explain the process and technical requirements for meeting digital identity assurance levels for identity proofing, authentication, and federation—including requirements for security and privacy, as well as considerations for improved customer experience of digital identity solutions and technology.
There are also many substantial content changes to the entire suite of documents.
The purpose of this workshop was to gather community feedback on the Cybersecurity and AI Workshop Concept Paper to inform the direction and contents of the Cyber AI Profile. The team is currently working to publish a workshop summary – in the interim, this blog shares a preview of what they heard during this event.
Review the Pre-Recorded Session in Advance of Virtual Series
The NIST NCCoE team has generated a pre-recorded video to help you prepare to participate in the virtual working sessions – you’re encouraged to listen to the recording in advance of the session(s) you plan to participate in so that you’re prepared for a productive discussion. The recording covers:
Introduction to the NCCoE
Background and Purpose of the Cyber AI Profile
Overviews of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and Community Profiles
These events are open to the public. We encourage cybersecurity and AI leaders from industry, academia, and government to share expertise on cybersecurity for AI and AI for cybersecurity. Please come ready to share your knowledge and insights during these interactive working sessions!
Register Now
Visit the NCCoE event session pages to learn more. We welcome you to register for any session topic you’re interested in discussing. Attendance for each event is limited to 500 participants.
Over the last several days, SonicWall issued an advisory of a notable increase in both internally and externally reported cyber incidents involving Gen 7 SonicWall firewalls where SSL VPN is enabled. A likely zero-day vulnerability in SonicWall VPNs is being actively exploited to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and deploy ransomware. Threat actors are likely to pivot directly to domain controllers within hours of the initial breach.
SonicWall is actively investigating these incidents to determine whether they are connected to a previously disclosed vulnerability or if a new vulnerability may be responsible.
Until further notice, SonicWall strongly advises, where practical, disabling the VPN service immediately and applying other mitigations in the advisory to reduce exposure while SonicWall continues its investigation.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this Joint White Paper to raise awareness of cyber threat actors (CTAs) activity targeting vendor accounts within vendor portals belonging to US state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government or public entities, as well as school districts and higher-education institutions.
The FBI refers to these incidents as vendor account compromises (VACs). Since 2023, the FBI has recorded an uptick in the number of unique threat actor groups conducting VACs. This uptick appears to be in part due to CTAs’ increased awareness of the extent to which government and academic entities rely on online systems for conducting business and managing payment information. These CTAs use a mix of social engineering and exploitation of portal authentication measures to gain unauthorized access to vendor accounts, with the goal of manipulating vendor records and redirecting vendor payments. Increased cyber actor adoption of this scheme for stealing vendor payments poses an increased risk, as successful VACs can result in millions or tens of millions of lost dollars.
The FBI and MS-ISAC encourage organizations who use their own public-facing vendor portals, specifically federal and SLTT government entities, along with educational institutions, implement the recommendations in the mitigations section of this Joint White Paper to reduce the likelihood and impact of VAC incidents. The FBI and MS-ISAC also encourage these same organizations to educate both their information technology teams and finance and procurement teams on the VAC threat and the mitigations, as collaboration between these teams is integral to vendor portal security.
This Joint White Paper includes an overview of the VAC threat, a walkthrough of typical steps of VAC incidents, characteristics of VAC actors, and ways to mitigate the VAC threat.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and US Coast Guard (USCG) are issuing this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory to present findings from a recent CISA and USCG hunt engagement. The purpose of this advisory is to highlight identified cybersecurity issues, thereby informing security defenders in other organizations of potential similar issues and encouraging them to take proactive measures to enhance their cybersecurity posture.
CISA led a proactive hunt engagement at a US critical infrastructure organization with the support of USCG analysts. During hunts, CISA proactively searches for evidence of malicious cyber activity or threat actor presence on customer networks. The organization invited CISA to conduct a proactive hunt to determine if a threat actor had been present in the organization’s environment.
During this engagement, CISA did not identify evidence of malicious cyber activity or threat actor presence on the organization’s network, but did identify cybersecurity risks.
In coordination with the organization where the hunt was conducted, CISA and USCG are sharing cybersecurity risk findings and associated mitigations to assist other critical infrastructure organizations with improving their cybersecurity posture. Recommendations are listed for each of CISA’s findings, as well as general practices to strengthen cybersecurity for OT environments. These mitigations align with CISA and the National Institute for Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals and with mitigations provided in the USCG Cyber Command’s 2024 Cyber Trends and Insights in the Marine Environment Report.
Although no malicious activity was identified during this engagement, critical infrastructure organizations are advised to review and implement the mitigations listed in this advisory to prevent potential compromises and better protect our national infrastructure. These mitigations are listed in order of importance.
The NJCCIC received reports of a surge in cryptocurrency scams in the past month. These scams aim to steal personally identifiable information (PII), private keys, wallet addresses, and funds. In fraudulent investment schemes, threat actors impersonate legitimate organizations, experienced investment advisors, or registered professionals as part of an investment group. They send unsolicited requests to convince their targets to deposit funds on fraudulent platforms with lures of high-yield, quick-return investments, gold trading, mining, and electric scooter rentals. Weeks or months later, the targets cannot withdraw funds from the fraudulent platforms, or they do not receive the promised payment on their investments. The reported losses from these fraudulent investment schemes ranged from approximately $2,500 to $310,000.
Threat actors also impersonate cryptocurrency platforms, such as Coinbase, in unsolicited emails, text messages, and phone calls. These scams create urgency with claims of compromised accounts, security concerns, and suspicious logins or account activity. Also, unsuspecting targets may search for legitimate customer service phone numbers, potentially revealing “poisoned” search results . If they take further action to “resolve” the urgent issue, the threat actors claim to require account verification or authentication. Once the targets divulge sensitive information and their private keys, funds are transferred to threat actor-controlled cryptocurrency wallets. The reported losses from these scams ranged from approximately $1,300 to $274,000.
Recommendations
Do your research when purchasing cryptocurrency and look for reputable sources. Check for reviews and performance history. Never invest more than you can afford to lose. Avoid clicking links, opening attachments, responding to, or acting on unsolicited communications. Independently verify unsolicited offers and do not release any personally identifying information, financial details, or funds until you have confirmed the legitimacy of the offer. Always refrain from sharing your private key or seed phrase with anyone.Keep systems and apps up to date. Report these scams and malicious cyber activity to the NJCCIC, the FBI’s IC3, and the FTC. If victimized, monitor bank accounts, credit profiles, and other online accounts for any irregularities or suspicious behavior. Review the Identity Theft and Compromised PII NJCCIC Informational Report for additional recommendations and resources, including credit freezes and enabling MFA on accounts. Review the NJCCIC Cryptocurrency Scams webpage for additional information, recommendations, and resources.
Malicious cell phone applications can hide in plain sight, often disguised as legitimate programs. Threat actors aim to deceive users into installing malicious software and giving permissions far beyond what legitimate apps require.
Image Source: Zimperium
To avoid the inherent distrust that users may have toward apps outside of the official Google Play Store, threat actors imitate legitimate companies and find creative ways to distribute their malware. DoubleTrouble, a banking trojan, disguises itself as an extension, even using the Google Play icon to add a sense of trustworthiness. In a new campaign, threat actors have been utilizing Discord-hosted Android Packages ( APKs) to disseminate the most recent version of DoubleTrouble. This variant has many features, including screen capture, keylogging, stealing clipboard data, and employing obfuscation techniques to remain stealthy on an infected device.
Image Source: CTM360
In another campaign, dubbed ClickTok, threat actors impersonate TikTok’s in-app e-commerce platform, which includes TikTok’s Shop, Wholesale, and Mall. Utilizing AI-generated content, threat actors create fake ads and mimic influencers and brand ambassadors to lure users to fake websites. They use these fake TikTok Shops to attempt to trick users into sharing their credentials, purchasing bogus products, or installing malware, such as SparkKitty Spyware.
The PlayPraetor Android trojan has been distributed primarily across Portugal, Spain, France, Morocco, Peru, and Hong Kong, infecting over 11,000 devices. This campaign utilizes Meta ads that lead to thousands of pages imitating Google Play Store download pages. PlayPraetor has been observed harvesting card information, personally identifiable information (PII), and online banking credentials.
Recommendations
Users are advised to only download applications from official sources.Users who downloaded the malicious apps are urged to uninstall them promptly.Credentials used to log in to malicious apps should immediately be changed.Review the requested permissions and never grant access to the “Accessibility Services.”Keep Google Play Protect enabled on all Android devices.Provide personal or financial information or transfer money to only legitimate and verified websites.Regularly update your mobile device and its applications.Run updated and reputable anti-malware programs on devices.
NIST will host a public webinar to discuss the recently released final version of Special Publication 800-63, Digital Identity Guidelines, Revision 4, which intends to respond to the changing digital landscape that has emerged since the last major revision of this suite was published by NIST in 2017.
This informative webinar featuring NIST’s identity team will cover the content changes recently made to the entire suite of Digital Identity Guidelines documents and will explore topics such as technical requirements for meeting digital identity assurance levels, requirements for security and privacy, and considerations for an improved customer experience relative to digital identity solutions and technology.
Those interested are encouraged to join and bring questions.