XP – Page 5 – My information Resource (blog.mir.net)

Vulnerability in React Server Component Could Allow for Remote Code Execution

This Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Advisory is being provided to assist agencies and organizations in guarding against the persistent malicious actions of cybercriminals.

A vulnerability in the React Server Components (RSC) implementation has been discovered that could allow for remote code execution. Specifically, it could allow for unauthenticated remote code execution on affected servers. The issue stems from unsafe deserialization of RSC “Flight” protocol payloads, enabling an attacker to send a crafted request that triggers execution of code on the server. This is now being called, “React2Shell” by security researchers.

Threat Intelligence

Active exploitation has been reported in the wild, specifically by Chinese threat actor groups.

Systems Affected

React Server Components – all versions prior to React 19.0.1, 19.1.2, and 19.2.1 Next.js 15.x – all versions prior to the patched 15.x release Next.js 16.x – all versions prior to the patched 16.x release Any frameworks or tools that bundle React Server Components prior to the patched React versions

Risk

Government:
– Large and medium government entities: High
– Small government entities: Medium

Businesses:
– Large and medium business entities: High
– Small business entities: Medium

Home Users: Low

Recommendations

Apply appropriate updates provided by React to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. Use vulnerability scanning to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them. Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.

Charting the Course for NIST OSCAL: NIST CSWP 53 is Available for Public Comment

The initial public draft of NIST Cybersecurity White Paper (CSWP) 53, Charting the Course for NIST OSCAL, is available for public comment. This paper introduces the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL) — an open-source, machine-readable language that standardizes security documentation for better monitoring and risk management.

OSCAL was developed to modernize manual, paper-based cybersecurity compliance through automated, scalable processes and continuous assessments. This draft describes OSCAL’s layered architecture, its growing global adoption, and its future integration with emerging technologies (e.g., digital twins, agentic AI) for autonomous risk reasoning and continuous assurance.

The public comment period is open through January 13, 2026. See the publication details for a copy of the draft and instructions for submitting comments.

Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology

Since the public release of ChatGPT in November 2022, artificial intelligence (AI) has been integrated into many facets of human society. For critical infrastructure owners and operators, AI can potentially be used to increase efficiency and productivity, enhance decision-making, save costs, and improve customer experience. Despite the many benefits, integrating AI into operational technology (OT) environments that manage essential public services also introduces significant risks—such as OT process models drifting over time or safety-process bypasses—that owners and operators must carefully manage to ensure the availability and reliability of critical infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre, in collaboration with Federal and International partners, have released Cybersecurity Guidance which provides critical infrastructure owners and operators with practical information for integrating AI into OT environments. This guidance outlines four key principles critical infrastructure owners and operators can follow to leverage the benefits of AI in OT systems while reducing risk.

The authoring agencies encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to review this guidance and action the principles so they can safely and securely integrate AI into OT systems.

Please do not hesitate to contact the NJCCIC at njccic@cyber.nj.gov with any questions. Also, for more background on our recent cybersecurity efforts, please visit cyber.nj.gov.

NICE Releases NICE Framework Components v2.1.0

PRC State-Sponsored Actors Use BRICKSTORM Malware Across Public Sector and Information Technology Systems

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is aware of ongoing intrusions by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors using BRICKSTORM malware for long-term persistence on victim systems. BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor for VMware vSphere and Windows environments. Victim organizations are primarily in the Government Services and Facilities and Information Technology Sectors. BRICKSTORM enables cyber actors to maintain stealthy access and provides capabilities for initiation, persistence, and secure command and control. The malware employs advanced functionality, including multiple layers of encryption (e.g., HTTPS, WebSockets, and nested TLS), DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to conceal communications, and a SOCKS proxy to facilitate lateral movement and tunneling within victim networks. BRICKSTORM also incorporates long-term persistence mechanisms, such as a self-monitoring function that automatically reinstalls or restarts the malware if disrupted, ensuring its continued operation.

The initial access vector varies. In one confirmed compromise, PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors accessed a web server inside the organization’s demilitarized zone (DMZ), moved laterally to an internal VMware vCenter server, then implanted BRICKSTORM malware. See CISA, the National Security Agency, and Canadian Cyber Security Centre’s (Cyber Centre’s) Joint Malware Analysis Report (MAR) BRICKSTORM Backdoor for analysis of the BRICKSTORM sample CISA obtained during an incident response engagement for this victim. The MAR also discusses seven additional BRICKSTORM samples, which exhibit variations in functionality and capabilities, further highlighting the complexity and adaptability of this malware.

After obtaining access to victim systems, PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors obtain and use legitimate credentials by performing system backups or capturing Active Directory database information to exfiltrate sensitive information. Cyber threat actors then target VMware vSphere platforms to steal cloned virtual machine (VM) snapshots for credential extraction and create hidden rogue VMs to evade detection.

CISA recommends network defenders hunt for existing intrusions and mitigate further compromise by taking the following actions:

Scan for BRICKSTORM using CISA-created YARA and Sigma rules, found in the joint (MAR) BRICKSTORM Backdoor. Block unauthorized DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers and external DoH network traffic to reduce unmonitored communications. Take inventory of all network edge devices and monitor for any suspicious network connectivity originating from these devices. Ensure proper network segmentation that restricts network traffic from the DMZ to the internal network.

Beware of Fraudulent Digital Asset Purchases

The NJCCIC observed multiple Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery (TOAD) campaigns targeting New Jersey State employees that purported to be legitimate notifications for purchases of digital assets or currencies. In one campaign, the email content lacks relevant context to the subject line phrases, such as “new log needs confirmation” or “update waiting for review.” The emails come from suspicious domains or out-of-country top-level domains (TLDs) and may contain an Adobe PDF attachment detailing the PayPal purchase. Another red flag is a purchase notification that is not personalized but sent to multiple recipients. Threat actors may add recipients in the “Bcc” field to appear more legitimate or circumvent some security filters that might identify emails sent to an extensive list in the “To” or “Cc” fields. In this campaign, threat actors create urgency by including a phone number if the target requires immediate assistance within the next 24 hours to dispute the “590.99$ USD” PayPal transaction. If the target calls the phone number, the threat actors impersonating a security team representative convince them to divulge sensitive information, such as account credentials or financial details, or download malicious software or a supposed remote support tool, which enables the threat actors to gain access to the device.

In a similar TOAD campaign, the subject line displays “your digital shield is now operational” and lacks relevant context to the email, which claims to be a Bitcoin purchase of “348.87 USD” via PayPal. The fraudulent transaction is part of an automated recurring purchase program or a monthly subscription. Threat actors provide a phone number for the target to cancel future automatic purchases or make changes within 24 hours.

In a separate campaign, the emails claim to be a Bitcoin purchase awaiting approval due to a previous transaction of “USD 767.69” reaching the maximum approved limit for a 24-hour period. They also include a billing support phone number for the target to call if they require assistance or wish to review the transaction details. Additionally, the fraudulent emails are disguised as WordPress notifications from the legitimate “comment-reply[@]wordpress[.]com” email address that facilitates blog comment notification and reply features. The threat actors abuse this service, hoping that their target will respond to the “posted” fraudulent purchase, either by calling the phone number or replying as a comment.

Recommendations

Refrain from clicking links, opening attachments, responding to, or acting on communications from unknown senders.

Exercise caution with unsolicited communications from known senders or legitimate platforms. Scrutinize messages, especially those with urgent language or confirmation of updates, changes, or requests.

Confirm messages from senders by verifying their contact information obtained from trusted and official sources before taking action, such as clicking on links or opening attachments.

Type official website URLs into browsers manually and only submit account credentials, personal information, or financial details on official websites.

Refrain from downloading or installing software from unknown sources. Keep systems and browsers up to date.

Monitor accounts and statements for any unauthorized activity.

Report malicious cyber activity to the NJCCIC and the FBI’s IC3.

Upcoming NIST Webinar: Resources for Ransomware Risk Management

Date: January 28, 2026

Time: 2:00-3:00PM ET

Ransomware is a persistent risk to organizations of all sizes and sectors, and addressing this risk requires collaboration across the public and private sectors to develop practical resources for organizations to reduce their ransomware risks.

Speakers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Center for Internet Security (CIS), and the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) will provide an overview of available ransomware risk management resources that help organizations get started with ransomware risk management by establishing foundational safeguards and building from there. Two resources that will be featured include:

NIST Ransomware Risk Management CSF 2.0 Community Profile—published as an Initial Public Draft on January 13, 2025, reflects changes made to the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) from CSF 1.1 to CSF 2.0 which identifies security objectives that support managing, detecting, responding to, and recovering from ransomware events. The publication can be used to gauge an organization’s readiness to counter ransomware threats, mitigate potential consequences of a ransomware event, and to develop a ransomware countermeasure playbook.
The IST and the Ransomware Task Force Blueprint for Ransomware Defense—which provides small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with an actionable framework to defend against the most common attacks. It is comprised of a subset of Implementation Group 1 (IG1) Safeguards from the CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls) v8 and aligned with NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, to help SMEs understand where they can get started with establishing a ransomware risk management strategy.

Speakers will provide an overview of the resources above, including how they were developed collaboratively, and will also discuss current and future efforts to address ransomware risk management. Ample time will be saved audience questions, ideas, and discussion.

Speakers:

Bill Fisher, Security Engineer, NIST
Valecia Stocchetti, Senior Cybersecurity Engineer, CIS Critical Security Controls
Michael Klein, Senior Director for Preparedness and Response, Institute for Security and Technology (IST)
Moderator: Daniel Eliot, Lead for Small Business Engagement, NIST

Increase in Compromised NJ Public Sector Accounts

Over the last several weeks, the NJCCIC has observed an increase in compromised New Jersey public sector accounts. These accounts are often compromised after a user submits their account credentials to a fraudulent webpage navigated to via a phishing email. These phishing emails are typically sent from accounts known to the recipient and therefore appear legitimate and trustworthy; however, the trusted sender’s account has been compromised, unbeknownst to the recipient. Recently observed tactics include the use of encrypted emails and attachments, and calendar invites to deliver malicious links and attachments. Threat actors’ use of personalized subject lines and file names lends authenticity to the messages, making recipients more likely to engage with them.

These phishing emails often use similar lures, in which the communications reference a document, message, report, or file that needs to be viewed. Specifically, the NJCCIC has noted an increase in Docusign phishing. Once the user clicks the included link in the email or attachment, they are often directed to a website that requests account credentials to view the document. If account credentials are entered, they are stolen by the threat actors. There have also been increasing efforts to obtain multi-factor authentication codes in these phishing schemes. The threat URLs included in recent campaigns often reference the compromised account’s organization, Microsoft products such as SharePoint, or document creator or form builder resources including Docusign or Jotform.

Many of these phishing emails originate from familiar, yet compromised, accounts associated with county and local government entities, such as health departments, social services, school districts, mayors’ offices, and public safety offices. As a result, recipients are likely to trust these communications. However, these phishing emails are often sent without context, with minimal content in the email body, and may come from accounts with which the recipient does not typically share documents. Document signing platforms are also frequently impersonated in these schemes. If you do not normally electronically sign documents received from the sender, this could indicate that the message is suspicious.

Examples from these phishing messages are included below.

Recommendations

Avoid opening attachments or clicking links delivered in emails and meeting invites, even those from known contacts, unless they are expected and in line with an established relationship. Verify communications with the sender via a separate means of communication before taking any action on their requests. Type official website URLs into browsers manually and only submit sensitive information on official websites. Notify users of this and similar tactics to increase awareness and reduce the risk of account compromises. Review the Don’t Take the Bait! Phishing and Other Social Engineering Attacks NJCCIC product for more information on common phishing and social engineering attacks.

Reporting
The NJCCIC encourages recipients who discover signs of malicious cyber activity to contact the NJCCIC via the cyber incident report form at www.cyber.nj.gov/report.

You’re Invited: Cybersecurity Connections Event & Networking Lunch on January 13, 2026

Due to the lapse in annual appropriations for the Department of Commerce, the NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) rescheduled the Cybersecurity Connections event that was originally scheduled for October 14, 2025. We apologize for the inconvenience and appreciate your understanding.

Event Date: January 13, 2026

Event Time: 11:00 a.m. – 1:30 p.m. (EST)

Event Location: 9700 Great Seneca Hwy, Rockville, MD 20850

Join the NIST NCCoE for a Cybersecurity Connections event highlighting exciting career opportunities in the cybersecurity field! Hosted in partnership with NICE (NIST), the Maryland Department of Commerce, and Montgomery County, this event is a unique opportunity to learn from industry experts and connect with cybersecurity professionals. By attending, you’ll gain valuable insights into the latest approaches to strengthening the cybersecurity workforce and network with like-minded professionals.

This event will feature a keynote presentation from Jessica Gulick, CEO and Founder of Katzcy and Commissioner of the U.S. Cyber Team. Jessica will discuss how the U.S. Cyber Games is advancing cybersecurity awareness, skills development, and cyber career preparation on a global scale. The keynote will also spotlight opportunities for Maryland-based individuals and organizations to engage with and support the initiatives of the U.S. Cyber Team.

In addition, our expert panel on building a robust cybersecurity workforce will discuss topics such as the critical skills and competencies needed to succeed in today’s cybersecurity landscape, the accessibility of cybersecurity education, and what workforce challenges critical infrastructure owners and operators may face in the future. This panel will be followed by a networking lunch, generously provided by the Montgomery County Economic Development Corporation on behalf of Montgomery County.

View the agenda.

Secure Your Spot!

Register now to attend in-person or virtually! We look forward to connecting with you to foster collaboration and innovation in the cybersecurity community.

*Registration closes on January 6.Register Now!

Recommendation for Key Management Comment on Draft Revision of NIST SP 800-57 Part 1

The initial public draft of NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-57 Part 1 Revision 6, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 – General, is available for comment through February 5, 2026. This recommendation provides general guidelines and best practices for managing cryptographic keying material.

Some of the proposed changes from Revision 5 include:

Ascon, as specified in SP 800-232, and the new quantum-resistant algorithms specified in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 203, 204, and 205 have been included.
The keys used for both key establishment and key storage are now discussed separately.
The security categories used in the Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) competition have been included, along with the quantum-resistant algorithms.
The time frames for algorithm approval status have been removed and replaced with references to SP 800-131A.
A section has been added to discuss keying material storage and mechanisms.

A complete list of changes is in Appendix F of the draft.

See the publication details for a copy of the draft and instructions for submitting comments.