Author: jay f

Critical Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Management Interface Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

 

Summary

  • A vulnerability in the authentication functionality of Cisco Wireless
    LAN Controller (WLC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote
    attacker to bypass authentication controls and log in to the device
    through the management interface

    This vulnerability is due to the improper implementation of the
    password validation algorithm. An attacker could exploit this
    vulnerability by logging in to an affected device with crafted
    credentials. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass
    authentication and log in to the device as an administrator. The
    attacker could obtain privileges that are the same level as an
    administrative user but it depends on the crafted credentials.

    Note: This vulnerability exists because of a
    non-default device configuration that must be present for it to be
    exploitable. For details about the vulnerable configuration, see the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory.

    Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are workarounds that address this vulnerability.

    This advisory is available at the following link:
    https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-wlc-auth-bypass-JRNhV4fF

Affected Products

  • Vulnerable Products

    This vulnerability affects the following Cisco products if they are
    running Cisco WLC Software Release 8.10.151.0 or Release 8.10.162.0 and
    have macfilter radius compatibility configured as Other:

    • 3504 Wireless Controller
    • 5520 Wireless Controller
    • 8540 Wireless Controller
    • Mobility Express
    • Virtual Wireless Controller (vWLC)

    Note: The vulnerable releases noted above are available in the Software Center
    on Cisco.com. In addition, specific customers have been given the
    following vulnerable escalation builds that are not in the Software
    Center:

    • 8.10.151.4 to 8.10.151.10
    • 8.10.162.1 to 8.10.162.14

    Determine the Configuration

    To determine whether the Cisco WLC configuration is vulnerable, issue the show macfilter summary CLI command. If RADIUS compatibility mode is other, as shown in the following example, the device is considered vulnerable:

    wlc > show macfilter summary 

    MAC Filter RADIUS Compatibility mode............. Other
    MAC Filter Delimiter............................. Single-Hyphen
    MAC Filter Entries............................... 0

    Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable

    Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory are known to be affected by this vulnerability.

    Cisco has confirmed that this vulnerability does not affect the following Cisco products:

    • Catalyst 9800 Embedded Wireless Controller for Catalyst 9300, 9400, and 9500 Series Switches
    • Catalyst 9800 Series Wireless Controllers
    • Catalyst 9800 Wireless Controller for Cloud
    • Embedded Wireless Controller on Catalyst Access Points
    • Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) AireOS products not listed in the Vulnerable Products section

Workarounds

  • There are workarounds that addresses this vulnerability. Choose one of the following based on the environment:

    Option 1: No Macfilters in the Environment

    Customers who do not use macfilters can reset the macfilter radius compatibility mode to the default value using the following CLI command:

    wlc > config macfilter radius-compat cisco

    Option 2: Macfilters in the Environment

    Customers who use macfilters and who are able to change the radius
    server configuration to match other possible compatibility modes can
    modify the macfilter compatibility to either cisco or free using one of the following CLI commands:

    wlc > config macfilter radius-compat cisco
    wlc > config macfilter radius-compat free

    For more information about the different macfilter compatibility modes, see Cisco Wireless Controller Command Reference.

    While these workarounds have been deployed and were proven successful
    in a test environment, customers should determine the applicability and
    effectiveness in their own environment and under their own use
    conditions. Customers should be aware that any workaround or mitigation
    that is implemented may negatively impact the functionality or
    performance of their network based on intrinsic customer deployment
    scenarios and limitations. Customers should not deploy any workarounds
    or mitigations before first evaluating the applicability to their own
    environment and any impact to such environment.

Fixed Software

  • Cisco has released free software updates
    that address the vulnerability described in this advisory. Customers
    with service contracts that entitle them to regular software updates
    should obtain security fixes through their usual update channels.

    Customers may only install and expect support for software versions
    and feature sets for which they have purchased a license. By installing,
    downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades,
    customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license:
    https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/end-user-license-agreement.html

    Additionally, customers may only download software for which they
    have a valid license, procured from Cisco directly, or through a Cisco
    authorized reseller or partner. In most cases this will be a maintenance
    upgrade to software that was previously purchased. Free security
    software updates do not entitle customers to a new software license,
    additional software feature sets, or major revision upgrades.

    The Cisco Support and Downloads page
    on Cisco.com provides information about licensing and downloads. This
    page can also display customer device support coverage for customers who
    use the My Devices tool.

    When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories page, to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

    In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded
    contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and
    software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the
    new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to
    contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted
    maintenance providers.

    Customers Without Service Contracts

    Customers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
    service contract and customers who make purchases through third-party
    vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their
    point of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco TAC: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/web/tsd-cisco-worldwide-contacts.html

    Customers should have the product serial number available and be
    prepared to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of entitlement
    to a free upgrade.

    Fixed Releases

    In the following table(s), the left column lists Cisco software
    releases. The right column indicates whether a release is affected by
    the vulnerability described in this advisory and the first release that
    includes the fix for this vulnerability. Customers are advised to
    upgrade to an appropriate fixed software release as indicated in this section.

    Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Release First Fixed Release
    8.9 and earlier Not vulnerable
    8.10.142.0 and earlier Not vulnerable
    8.10.151.0 and later 8.10.171.0

    To download the software from the Software Center on Cisco.com, do the following:

    1. Click Browse all.
    2. Choose Wireless > Wireless LAN Controller > Standalone Controllers.
    3. Choose a specific product from the right pane of the product selector.
    4. Choose a hardware platform from the left pane of the software page.

    The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) validates
    only the affected and fixed release information that is documented in
    this advisory.

Exploitation and Public Announcements

  • The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
    use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.

Source

  • Cisco would like to thank a security researcher with Bispok for reporting this vulnerability.

URL

Revision History

Version

See the cve

This ICS-capable malware targets a Ukrainian energy company

 From the ESET SITE 


Key points:

  • ESET researchers collaborated with CERT-UA to analyze the attack against the Ukrainian energy company
  • The destructive actions were scheduled for 2022-04-08 but artifacts suggest that the attack had been planned for at least two weeks
  • The attack used ICS-capable malware and regular disk wipers for Windows, Linux and Solaris operating systems
  • We assess with high confidence that the attackers used a new version of the Industroyer malware, which was used in 2016 to cut power in Ukraine
  • We assess with high confidence that the APT group Sandworm is responsible for this new attack
Read the full report here

APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices

 

This Joint Cybersecurity Advisory—coauthored
by the Department of Energy (DOE), the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA),
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is being released to warn
that certain advanced persistent threat (APT) actors have exhibited the
capability to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system
(ICS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices, including:

 

  • Schneider
    Electric programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
  • OMRON
    Sysmac NEX PLCs
  • Open
    Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers

 

The APT actors have developed
custom-made tools for targeting ICS/SCADA devices. The tools enable them to
scan for, compromise, and control affected devices once they have
established initial access to the operational technology (OT) network.
Additionally, the actors can compromise Windows-based engineering
workstations, which may be present in information technology (IT) or OT
environments, using an exploit that compromises an ASRock motherboard driver
with known vulnerabilities. By compromising and maintaining full
system access to ICS/SCADA devices, APT actors could elevate privileges,
move laterally within an OT environment, and disrupt critical devices or
functions.

 

This Joint Cybersecurity
Advisory contains technical details, recommended mitigation measures,
additional references, and is being provided to assist agencies and
organizations in guarding against the persistent malicious actions of cyber
criminals. DOE, CISA, NSA, and the FBI urge critical infrastructure
organizations, especially Energy Sector organizations, to implement the
detection and mitigation recommendations provided in this Joint
Cybersecurity Advisory to detect potential malicious APT activity and
harden their ICS/SCADA devices.

Free Azure Cosmos DB Conf

 

 

Next week, please join us for the second Azure Cosmos DB Conf (April 19-20, 2022).

 

Azure Cosmos DB Conf is an online, virtual conference
dedicated entirely to our customers and community sharing their knowledge and
experience building apps and services using Cosmos DB.

 

The event is run as three, 3-hour live streams in Americas,
APAC and EMEA, each with its own unique content, with a slate of on-demand
sessions as well.

Visit, Azure
Cosmos DB Conf to see our agenda and download an .ics save the date for
your calendar

Verizon Cell Phone user be ware new SMiShing Campaign

 

 

Image Source: CNET

 

A recent SMS text message
phishing (SMiShing) campaign is targeting Verizon Wireless customers
and customers of other providers that piggyback off the Verizon network,
such as Spectrum . These messages are
spoofed to appear as though the message was sent from the recipient’s own
phone number. The messages vary but typically thank the recipient for
paying their bill and offer a gift. The messages include a link to accept
the gift. These links may lead to malicious websites intending to steal
account credentials or personal information, or install malware. A similar campaign targeted AT&T customers in August
2021.

New Bot net Linked to Russian group Sandworm attacking ASUS and WatchGuard Devices

 Researchers discovered that
Cyclops Blink, a botnet linked to Russian advanced
persistent threat group Sandworm, is actively targeting ASUS
routers and WatchGuardfirewall appliances. The malware is modular – meaning it can easily be
updated to target new devices – and features a specialized module that may
allow the malware to read flash memory in order to gather information about
critical files, executables, data, and libraries. The malware then receives a
command to nest in the flash memory and establish persistence, as this storage
space can survive factory resets. Due to the number of indiscriminate targets,
analysts assess that the group’s intent behind this iteration of distribution
is to build and maintain a botnet infrastructure for future attacks on
high-value targets.

A tale of Caution

A few days ago, I found an
interesting and dangerous situation that I would like to warn you about.

 A company I know well was
under attack from a weakness on their web site.  It was a major intrusion
that needed immediate attention.

 My issues started when I tried
to contact anyone at the company to warn them about the problem.  

 I had to go through a “phone
tree” for support. When I finally got a human to answer, and I explained the
nature of the problem, and how it was time sensitive, the response I got was,
“Thanks for the information. Someone will get back to you in a WEEK! 
(the people who answered the phone were not IT support!)  

 What are your support staff
trained to do when an issue is called in? Do you train them and test the
process?  Think about the issues if this was ransomware!!  How long
would support have waited to call level 2 support?  How much data would
your company lose while waiting for a ticket to even get to the proper person ?

 TRAIN YOUR STAFF NOW so
that they can handle and respond to risks quickly in an appropriate
manner.  Don’t become a victim! 

 

High severity vulnerability in the Kubernetes container

CrowdStrike security researchers
discovered a high severity vulnerability, dubbed “cr8escape,” in the
Kubernetes container engine CRI-O – an open source, community-driven
container engine. Each Kubernetes node includes a container runtime such as
CRI-O. Among other tasks, the container runtime allows containerized apps
to safely share each node’s underlying Linux kernel and other resources.
The flaw, tracked as CVE-2022-0811  (CVSS v3 8.8), exists due to
the addition of sysctl support in version 1.19 used to configure kernel
parameters at runtime. Researchers determined that this flaw will now
“blindly set any kernel parameters it is passed without validation, meaning
that anyone who can deploy a pod on a cluster using the CRI-O runtime can
abuse the kernel.core_pattern  parameter to achieve
container escape and arbitrary code execution as root on any node in the
cluster.” Malicious threat actors may be able to exploit the vulnerability
in the components of the Kubernetes architecture, such as the control
plane, worker nodes, or containerized applications, to exfiltrate data and
move laterally across pods. The potential impact of this flaw is widespread
due to the number of platforms that use CRI-O, such as OpenShift and Oracle
Container Engine for Kubernetes. The vulnerability has been resolved and researchers urge users to patch immediately.