| Wearable, Implantable and Ingestible Medical Devices Could Revolutionize Your Health Care By Kamran Sayrafian, a senior scientist in NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory A few years ago, I heard on the news that many people were being hospitalized with a condition of excess fluid in the lungs, called pulmonary edema. It’s common in elderly patients. Pulmonary edema is dangerous and can lead to breathing difficulties and lung failure. Since it has the potential to develop suddenly, it can be a serious medical emergency. As a NIST researcher interested in the application of technology in health care, I wondered: Is there a way to monitor this condition at home with a simple wearable device? Read More |
Author: blogmirnet
NIST Finalizes ‘Lightweight Cryptography’ Standard to Protect Small Devices
| NIST Finalizes ‘Lightweight Cryptography’ Standard to Protect Small Devices It’s the little things that matter most, as the saying goes, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has got their back. NIST’s newly finalized lightweight cryptography standard provides a defense from cyberattacks for even the smallest of networked electronic devices. Released as Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices (NIST Special Publication 800-232), the standard contains tools designed to protect information created and transmitted by the billions of devices that form the Internet of Things (IoT) as well as other small electronics, such as RFID tags and medical implants. Miniature technologies like these often possess far fewer computational resources than computers or smartphones do, but they still need protection from cyberattacks. The answer is lightweight cryptography, which is designed to defend these sorts of resource-constrained devices. Read More |
Microsoft Azure Virtual Training Day: Migrate and Modernize your Apps for AI-powered Solutions
| Adapt your skills and master the tools you’ll need to thrive in an AI-powered world at a free Microsoft Azure Virtual Training Day from Microsoft Learn. Join us at Migrate and Modernize Your Apps for AI-powered Solutions and learn how to discover and assess your workloads and efficiently manage your cloud migration. Learn how to migrate on-premises web apps to Azure App Service with Azure Migrate—plus, see how migration optimizes costs, enhances security, and boosts developer innovation. You’ll explore how to use GitHub Copilot to identify and resolve migration challenges with its AI coding assistance. You’ll also discover ways to deliver improved customer experiences in Azure App Service using security, load balancing, autoscaling, and automated management capabilities. After completing this training, you’ll be eligible to take the Microsoft Azure Fundamentals certification at 50% off the exam price. You’ll have the opportunity to: Gain the skills needed to migrate your apps smoothly, efficiently, and with minimal code changes. Learn how to monitor the health and scale the performance of your app to maintain reliability and minimize downtime. Explore methods that help secure access to your app and manage app configuration and secrets. Chat with Microsoft experts—ask questions and find solutions to common app migration challenges. Join us at an upcoming two-part Migrate and Modernize Your Apps for AI-powered Solutions event: September 9, 2025 9:00 AM – 11:45 AM | (GMT-07:00) Pacific Time (US & Canada) 10:00 AM – 12:45 PM | (GMT-06:00) Mountain Time (US & Canada) 11:00 AM – 1:45 PM | (GMT-05:00) Central Time (US & Canada) 12:00 PM – 2:45 PM | (GMT-04:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) September 10, 2025 9:00 AM – 11:45 AM | (GMT-07:00) Pacific Time (US & Canada) 10:00 AM – 12:45 PM | (GMT-06:00) Mountain Time (US & Canada) Visit the Microsoft Virtual Training Days website to learn more about other event opportunities. 11:00 AM – 1:45 PM | (GMT-05:00) Central Time (US & Canada) 12:00 PM – 2:45 PM | (GMT-04:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada) Delivery Language: English Closed Captioning Language(s): English |
MS-ISAC CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY – Multiple Vulnerabilities in Apple Products Could Allow for Arbitrary Code Execution – PATCH NOW
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Apple products, the most severe of which could allow for arbitrary code execution. Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could allow for arbitrary code execution in the context of the logged on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.
THREAT INTELLEGENCE:
There are currently no reports of these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild.
SYSTEMS AFFECTED:
- Versions prior to iOS 18.6 and iPadOS 18.6
- Versions prior to iPadOS 17.7.9
- Versions prior to macOS Sequoia 15.6
- Versions prior to macOS Sonoma 14.7.7
- Versions prior to macOS Ventura 13.7.7
- Versions prior to watchOS 11.6
- Versions prior to tvOS 18.6
- Versions prior to visionOS 2.6
RISK:
Government:
- Large and medium government entities: High
- Small government entities: Medium
Businesses:
- Large and medium business entities: High
- Small business entities: Medium
Home users: Low
TECHNICAL SUMMARY:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Apple products, the most severe of which could allow for arbitrary code execution. Details of the vulnerabilities are as follows:
Tactic: Execution (TA0002):
Technique: Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203):
- Running an hdiutil command may unexpectedly execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2025-43187)
- An app may be able to execute arbitrary code out of its sandbox or with certain elevated privileges. (CVE-2025-24119)
Additional lower severity vulnerabilities include:
- Passcode may be read aloud by VoiceOver. (CVE-2025-31229)
- Privacy Indicators for microphone or camera access may not be correctly displayed. (CVE-2025-43217)
- Parsing a file may lead to an unexpected app termination. (CVE-2025-43186)
- A non-privileged user may be able to modify restricted network settings. (CVE-2025-43223)
- Processing a maliciously crafted audio file may lead to memory corruption. (CVE-2025-43277)
- Processing a maliciously crafted media file may lead to unexpected app termination or corrupt process memory. (CVE-2025-43210, CVE-2025-43224, CVE-2025-43221)
- An app may be able to access user-sensitive data. (CVE-2025-43230)
- Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. (CVE-2025-43209, CVE-2025-43214, CVE-2025-43213, CVE-2025-43212, CVE-2025-43216, CVE-2025-6558, CVE-2025-24188)
- Processing a maliciously crafted image may result in disclosure of process memory. (CVE-2025-43226, CVE-2025-43215)
- Processing a file may lead to memory corruption. (CVE-2025-43202, CVE-2025-7425)
- Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to memory corruption. (CVE-2025-7424, CVE-2025-31278, CVE-2025-31277, CVE-2025-31273)
- Remote content may be loaded even when the ‘Load Remote Images’ setting is turned off. (CVE-2025-31276)
- Processing a maliciously crafted texture may lead to unexpected app termination. (CVE-2025-43234)
- Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app termination. (CVE-2025-31281, CVE-2025-43254, CVE-2025-43239)
- Visiting a malicious website may lead to address bar spoofing. (CVE-2025-43228)
- Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose sensitive user information. (CVE-2025-43227)
- Processing web content may lead to a denial-of-service. (CVE-2025-43211)
- Processing maliciously crafted web content may disclose internal states of the app. (CVE-2025-43265)
- An attacker may be able to cause unexpected app termination. (CVE-2025-43222, CVE-2025-43236)
- An app may be able to access protected user data. (CVE-2025-43220, CVE-2025-43245, CVE-2025-43198, CVE-2025-43206, CVE-2025-43185)
- An app may be able to fingerprint the user. (CVE-2025-31279)
- A remote attacker may be able to cause unexpected system termination. (CVE-2025-24224)
- An app may be able to access sensitive user data. (CVE-2025-43225, CVE-2025-43195, CVE-2025-43267, CVE-2025-43197, CVE-2025-43246)
- An app may be able to read a persistent device identifier. (CVE-2025-24220)
- An app may be able to cause a denial-of-service. (CVE-2025-43191, CVE-2025-43235, CVE-2025-43193)
- An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. (CVE-2025-43244, CVE-2025-43255, CVE-2025-43237, CVE-2025-43238)
- An app may be able to gain root privileges. (CVE-2025-31243, CVE-2025-43249, CVE-2025-43196, CVE-2025-43256)
- A malicious app may be able to launch arbitrary binaries on a trusted device. (CVE-2025-43253)
- A malicious app may be able to gain root privileges. (CVE-2025-43248, CVE-2025-43199, CVE-2025-43188, CVE-2025-43268)
- An app may be able to break out of its sandbox. (CVE-2025-43257, CVE-2025-43261, CVE-2025-43275, CVE-2025-43266, CVE-2025-43250)
- A sandboxed process may be able to circumvent sandbox restrictions. (CVE-2025-43273, CVE-2025-43274)
- iCloud Private Relay may not activate when more than one user is logged in at the same time. (CVE-2025-43276)
- Account-driven User Enrollment may still be possible with Lockdown Mode turned on. (CVE-2025-43192)
- A sandboxed process may be able to launch any installed app. (CVE-2025-31275)
- Processing a maliciously crafted image may corrupt process memory. (CVE-2025-43264, CVE-2025-43219)
- Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to heap corruption. (CVE-2025-31280)
- Processing a maliciously crafted USD file may disclose memory contents. (CVE-2025-43218)
- An app may gain unauthorized access to Local Network. (CVE-2025-43270)
- An app may be able to hijack entitlements granted to other privileged apps. (CVE-2025-43260)
- A malicious app with root privileges may be able to modify the contents of system files. (CVE-2025-43247)
- An app may be able to modify protected parts of the file system. (CVE-2025-43194, CVE-2025-43243)
- An app may be able to bypass certain Privacy preferences. (CVE-2025-43232)
- An app may be able to read files outside of its sandbox. (CVE-2025-43241)
- A malicious app acting as a HTTPS proxy could get access to sensitive user data. (CVE-2025-43233)
- A local attacker may gain access to Keychain items. (CVE-2025-43251)
- A malicious app may be able to read kernel memory. (CVE-2025-43189)
- Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to universal cross site scripting. (CVE-2025-43229)
- A download’s origin may be incorrectly associated. (CVE-2025-43240)
- An attacker with physical access to a locked device may be able to view sensitive user information. (CVE-2025-43259)
- A website may be able to access sensitive user data when resolving symlinks. (CVE-2025-43252)
- A shortcut may be able to bypass sensitive Shortcuts app settings. (CVE-2025-43184)
Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could allow for arbitrary code execution in the context of the logged on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
We recommend the following actions be taken:
- Apply the stable channel update provided by Apple to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. (M1051: Update Software)
- Safeguard 7.1 : Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process: Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.
- Safeguard 7.2 : Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process: Establish and maintain a risk-based remediation strategy documented in a remediation process, with monthly, or more frequent, reviews.
- Safeguard 7.6 : Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Externally-Exposed Enterprise Assets: Perform automated vulnerability scans of externally-exposed enterprise assets using a SCAP-compliant vulnerability scanning tool. Perform scans on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.
- Safeguard 7.7 : Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities: Remediate detected vulnerabilities in software through processes and tooling on a monthly, or more frequent, basis, based on the remediation process.
- Safeguard 16.13 Conduct Application Penetration Testing: Conduct application penetration testing. For critical applications, authenticated penetration testing is better suited to finding business logic vulnerabilities than code scanning and automated security testing. Penetration testing relies on the skill of the tester to manually manipulate an application as an authenticated and unauthenticated user.
- Safeguard 18.1 : Establish and Maintain a Penetration Testing Program: Establish and maintain a penetration testing program appropriate to the size, complexity, and maturity of the enterprise. Penetration testing program characteristics include scope, such as network, web application, Application Programming Interface (API), hosted services, and physical premise controls; frequency; limitations, such as acceptable hours, and excluded attack types; point of contact information; remediation, such as how findings will be routed internally; and retrospective requirements.
- Safeguard 18.2 : Perform Periodic External Penetration Tests: Perform periodic external penetration tests based on program requirements, no less than annually. External penetration testing must include enterprise and environmental reconnaissance to detect exploitable information. Penetration testing requires specialized skills and experience and must be conducted through a qualified party. The testing may be clear box or opaque box.
- Safeguard 18.3 : Remediate Penetration Test Findings: Remediate penetration test findings based on the enterprise’s policy for remediation scope and prioritization.
- Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. (M1026: Privileged Account Management)
- Safeguard 4.7: Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software: Manage default accounts on enterprise assets and software, such as root, administrator, and other pre-configured vendor accounts. Example implementations can include: disabling default accounts or making them unusable.
- Safeguard 5.4: Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts: Restrict administrator privileges to dedicated administrator accounts on enterprise assets. Conduct general computing activities, such as internet browsing, email, and productivity suite use, from the user’s primary, non-privileged account.
- Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc. (M1021: Restrict Web-Based Content)
- Safeguard 2.3: Address Unauthorized Software: Ensure that unauthorized software is either removed from use on enterprise assets or receives a documented exception. Review monthly, or more frequently.
- Safeguard 2.7: Allowlist Authorized Scripts: Use technical controls, such as digital signatures and version control, to ensure that only authorized scripts, such as specific .ps1, .py, etc., files, are allowed to execute. Block unauthorized scripts from executing. Reassessbi-annually, or more frequently.
- Safeguard 9.3: Maintain and Enforce Network-Based URL Filters: Enforce and update network-based URL filters to limit an enterprise asset from connecting to potentially malicious or unapproved websites. Example implementations include category-based filtering, reputation-based filtering, or through the use of block lists. Enforce filters for all enterprise assets.
- Safeguard 9.6: Block Unnecessary File Types: Block unnecessary file types attempting to enter the enterprise’s email gateway.
- Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring. (M1050: Exploit Protection)
- Safeguard 10.5: Enable Anti-Exploitation Features: Enable anti-exploitation features on enterprise assets and software, where possible, such as Microsoft® Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Windows® Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG), or Apple® System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper™.
- Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking. (M1038:Execution Prevention)
- Safeguard 2.5 : Allowlist Authorized Software: Use technical controls, such as application allowlisting, to ensure that only authorized software can execute or be accessed. Reassess bi-annually, or more frequently.
- Safeguard 2.6 : Allowlist Authorized Libraries: Use technical controls to ensure that only authorized software libraries, such as specific .dll, .ocx, .so, etc., files, are allowed to load into a system process. Block unauthorized libraries from loading into a system process. Reassess bi-annually, or more frequently.
- Safeguard 2.7 : Allowlist Authorized Scripts: Use technical controls, such as digital signatures and version control, to ensure that only authorized scripts, such as specific .ps1, .py, etc., files, are allowed to execute. Block unauthorized scripts from executing. Reassess bi-annually, or more frequently.
- Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior. (M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint)
- Safeguard 13.2 : Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Detection Solution: Deploy a host-based intrusion detection solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate and/or supported.
- Safeguard 13.7 : Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution: Deploy a host-based intrusion prevention solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate and/or supported. Example implementations include use of an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) client or host-based IPS agent.
REFERENCES:
Apple:
https://support.apple.com/en-us/100100
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124147
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124148
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124149
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124150
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124151
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124155
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124153
https://support.apple.com/en-us/124154
CVE:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-6558
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-7424
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-7425
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-24119
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-24188
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-24220
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-24224
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31229
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31243
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31273
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31275
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31276
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31277
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31278
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31279
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31280
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31281
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43184
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43185
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43186
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43187
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43188
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43189
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43191
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43192
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43193
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43194
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43195
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43196
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43197
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43198
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43199
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43202
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43206
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43209
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43210
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43211
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43212
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43213
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43214
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43215
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43216
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43217
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43218
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43219
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43220
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43221
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43222
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43223
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43224
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43225
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43226
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43227
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43228
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43229
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43230
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43232
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43233
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43234
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43235
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43236
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43237
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43238
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43239
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43240
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43241
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43243
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43244
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43245
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43246
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43247
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43248
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43249
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43250
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43251
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43252
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43253
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43254
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43255
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43256
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43257
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43259
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43260
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43261
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43264
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43265
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43266
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43267
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43268
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43270
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43273
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43274
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43275
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43276
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-43277
Threat Actors Abuse Microsoft 365 Direct Send in Phishing Campaigns
| Over the last several months, security researchers have observed threat actors targeting Microsoft 365 (M365) accounts in phishing campaigns that bypass security controls. The technique allows threat actors to spoof internal M365 users and deliver emails using Microsoft Exchange Online’s Direct Send function. Direct Send lacks proper authentication and is easily exploitable, making it a desirable tactic for threat actors. Microsoft allows emails to be sent using Direct Send by default if the emails are sent from the organization’s accepted domain. Microsoft 365 administrators can implement “Reject Direct Send” to block unauthenticated Direct Send traffic at the tenant level. Direct Send may also be disabled using PowerShell. In addition to disabling Direct Send, the NJCCIC recommends following Microsoft’s Email Security Best Practices for M365, including identifying SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures, use authenticated SMTP client submissions or SMTP relay with specific IP restrictions, implement strict DMARC policies, configure SPF to hardfail, and enforce MFA for M365 accounts. For additional information and guidance, review the Varonis blog post. |
NEW BLOG | Reflections from the First Cyber AI Profile Workshop
Thank you to everyone who participated in the Cyber AI Profile Workshop NIST hosted this past April! This work intends to support the cybersecurity and AI communities — and the input you provided during this workshop is critical. We are working to publish a Workshop Summary that captures themes and highlights from the event. In the interim, we would like to share a preview of what we heard.
Background on the Cyber AI Profile Workshop
As NIST began exploring the idea of a Cyber AI Profile and writing the Cybersecurity and AI Workshop Concept Paper leading up to this workshop, stakeholders told us there are several cybersecurity topics that are top of mind as businesses adopt AI. The Cyber AI Profile aims to offer practical guidance to address those topics by applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to address three Focus Areas…Read the Blog
Second Public Draft | Supply Chain Traceability: Manufacturing Meta-Framework
The NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) has released a second public draft of NIST Internal Report 8536, Supply Chain Traceability: Manufacturing Meta-Framework for public comment.
We thank everyone who submitted comments on the initial draft. Your thoughtful feedback prompted substantial revisions. In response, we are publishing this second draft to provide an opportunity for further review and input before finalizing the report.
Background
This paper presents a framework to improve traceability across complex and distributed manufacturing ecosystems. It enables structured recording, linking, and querying of traceability data across trusted repositories. This initial research is intended to explore approaches that may support stakeholders in verifying product provenance, meeting contractual obligations, and assessing supply chain integrity.
This framework builds on previous NIST research (NIST IR 8419) and incorporates insight and feedback from industry, standards bodies, and academia. It is designed to enhance national security, economic resilience, and supply chain risk management, particularly across manufacturing and other critical infrastructure sectors.
We invite and encourage those interested to review and comment on this draft.
Submit Your Comments
The public comment period for this draft is open through September 1, 2025. Visit the project page for a copy of the draft and instructions for submitting comments. We value and welcome your input and look forward to your comments.
Get Engaged
You can continue to help shape and contribute to this and future projects by joining the NCCoE’s Blockchain Community of Interest. Visit our project page to join.
Comment Now: NIST NCCoE Chatbot Internal Report
The NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) has re-issued NIST Internal Report (IR) 8579, Developing the NCCoE Chatbot: Technical and Security Learnings from the Initial Implementation. Originally published in June, the document was revised to improve the document’s demonstration of the enhanced abilities of an RAG-based LLM tool over a generic LLM.
The public comment period for the publication has been extended and will close on September 11, 2025.
The NCCoE identified a potential application for a chatbot to support its mission and developed a secure, internal-use chatbot to assist NCCoE staff with searching and summarizing cybersecurity guidelines tailored to specific audiences or use cases.
The chatbot was built using retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)-based LLM technology. This approach combines techniques from information retrieval and natural language generation, enabling the chatbot to provide more focused, contextually relevant responses by leveraging a repository of cybersecurity knowledge, including previous NCCoE publications. Compared to search engines, LLM-based chatbots provide more contextually relevant and precise responses by understanding the nuances of natural language queries.
This report provides a point-in-time examination of the NCCoE Chatbot, outlining the NCCoE’s approach to developing the tool, as well as the NCCoE’s response to specific security challenges. In addition, this report provides an overview of the chatbot and its supporting technologies so that other organizations might consider the benefits of their use.
We encourage you to review this document and provide comments by September 11, 2025. If you have any questions, please email the team at nlp-nccoe@nist.gov.
Comment Now!
Russia Cyber Threat Operations
Russian nation-state cyber actors remain among the most persistent, capable, and strategically aligned threats in the global cyber landscape. Their operations routinely target Western governments, critical infrastructure, defense contractors, and political institutions, using a combination of cyber espionage, advanced malware, and living-off-the-land techniques. These campaigns are characterized by prolonged presence, covert operations, and strategic alignment with Russia’s geopolitical goals, making them especially challenging to detect and mitigate.
A key takeaway from this analysis is that Russian cyber activity is not merely opportunistic; it is intentional and ongoing, designed to maintain persistent access for future disruption, espionage, or influence efforts. Russia’s ability to blend into trusted environments and exploit legitimate platforms significantly raises the threat to national security, essential services, and the private sector.
In the broader risk context, Russia exemplifies the intersection of cyber operations and hybrid warfare, where espionage, sabotage, and geopolitical strategy align. Organizations must prioritize detection and hardening against known Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), particularly those involving credential theft, cloud environment exploitation, and lateral movement, as these remain core elements of Russia’s offensive cyber strategy.
Key Points
- Who: Russian state-sponsored actors, including APT28 (Fancy Bear), APT29 (Cozy Bear), Sandworm, and Gamaredon.
- What: Conducted cyber espionage, prepositioned in networks, and launched disruptive operations aligned with Russian geopolitical goals.
- How: Used spearphishing, credential harvesting, zero-day exploits, cloud service abuse, and stealthy tools like living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) and custom malware.
- Why it matters: These operations are designed not only for data theft but also to maintain persistent access, evade detection, and retain the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure or manipulate information at strategic moments.
Risk Assessment
The NJCCIC has assessed that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors represent a persistent and evolving threat with the demonstrated capability and intent to conduct both intelligence-gathering and disruptive operations. Their activities seriously threaten national security, essential public services, and critical industries.
Recently, these groups have changed tactics by increasingly targeting cloud infrastructure and identity management platforms like Microsoft 365. This evolution includes deploying new malware variants designed to evade traditional detection methods, allowing them to infiltrate previously considered lower-risk environments.
Russian actors have a well-documented history of targeting entities across government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, defense, and election systems. The likelihood of exposure or compromise is significantly higher if environments include legacy technology or commonly used third-party platforms. The combination of their strategic intent, advanced techniques, and a sector’s relevance makes proactive defense and visibility into these threat vectors essential.
Timeline of Activity
| Attribution | Start Date | End Date | Location | Sector | Activity |
| APT 28 (Fancy Bear) | 2007 | Present | Global (US, NATO, and Europe) | Government, Military, and Media | Espionage, election interference, credential theft, hack and leak operations |
| APT 29 (Cozy Bear) | 2008 | Present | Global | Government, Think Tanks, and NGOs | Cyber espionage, credential harvesting, and supply chain compromises |
| Turla (Venomous Bear) | 2008 | Present | Europe and the Middle East | Government, Military, and Research | Long-term espionage, custom malware, and hijacking satellite infrastructure |
| Berserk Bear (Energetic Bear) | 2010 | Present | Europe and the US | Energy and ICS | ICS reconnaissance, credential harvesting, and infrastructure targeting |
| Gamaredon (Primitive Bear) | 2013 | Present | Ukraine | Government | Phishing, malware, and espionage |
| Sandworm Team | 2014 | Present | Ukraine and Global | Energy, ICS, and Telecom | Destructive Malware (NotPetya), ICS Attacks, and Wiper Malware |
| Evil Corp (Indrik Spider) | 2014 | Present | Global | Finance, Retail, and Healthcare | Banking trojans and ransomware deployments |
| Star Blizzard | 2017 | Present | UK, US, and Ukraine | Academia and Government | Credential theft and phishing |
| Shuckworm | 2017 | Present | Ukraine | Government | Using old malware |
| Nobelium (Subset of APT 29) | 2020 | 2021 | Global | IT, Government, and Supply Chain | SolarWinds compromise, cloud service, and lateral movement |
| NoName057(16) | 2022 | Present | Europe, NATO-aligned States | Government and Media | DDoS ops focused on Finland, Latvia, and Poland. Activity spikes during major NATO summits and political votes. |
| KillNet (pro-Russian hacktivist) | 2022 | Present | NATO, EU, and US | Government, Healthcare, and Transportation | DDoS attack on US hospital, Polish rail, and airport websites. |
| Fancy Bear | 2022 | Present | Europe and the US | Critical Infrastructure | Compromise of CCTV at transit hubs to monitor Western Military Aid |
| RomCom | 2024 | Present | Europe and the US | Government, Defense, Energy, Pharma, and Legal | Zero-click exploits via Firefox (CVE-2024-9680) and Windows (CVE-2024-49039), deploying RATs |
Capabilities
- Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs): Russia maintains multiple state-sponsored groups (APT28, APT29, Sandworm) capable of long-term, covert operations across sectors.
- Malware Toolsets: Known for deploying malware such as NotPetya, Snake, Drovorub, WellMess, and CosmicDuke.
- Tradecraft: Uses living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), legitimate credentials, and cloud platform abuse (Microsoft 365).
- Operational Focus: Supports espionage, prepositioning in critical infrastructure, disinformation, and destructive attacks aligned with geopolitical goals.
- Supply Chain Intrusions: Demonstrated ability to compromise software providers and abuse trusted relationships (SolarWinds, Ukrainian tax software).
- ICS/OT Disruption: Proven capacity to target and impact operational technology systems (BlackEnergy, Industroyer).
- Information Warfare: Coordinates cyber operations with disinformation and influence campaigns targeting elections and public opinion.
Key Intelligence Gaps
The NJCCIC has assessed that several intelligence gaps limit a full Russian cyber threat landscape assessment. One of the most pressing concerns is whether Russian threat actors are currently positioning themselves within networks to carry out future physical or disruptive attacks, particularly amid ongoing geopolitical tensions and hybrid warfare strategies.
Another critical intelligence gap concerns developing and deploying new malware strains, particularly malware designed to target industrial control systems (ICS), satellite infrastructure, or emerging space technologies, where visibility remains low.
The degree of coordination between Russian intelligence services and non-state criminal cyber groups (such as ransomware-as-a-service operators) also remains unclear. It is essential to determine how much operational freedom these groups have and whether they receive explicit support or protection from the state. There is also a lack of clarity about whether Russia’s agencies are working together or against each other.
Additionally, there is limited insight into evolving Russian tactics for evading detection, especially in hybrid and multi-cloud environments, where traditional monitoring tools may fall short.
The impact of economic sanctions and wartime constraints on Russia’s cyber strategy and operational capabilities is also poorly understood, leaving a gap in forecasting future shifts in tactics or targeting priorities.
Known Threat Groups
- APT28: Fancy Bear, Sofacy, STRONTIUM, Sednit
- Sandworm Team: BlackEnergy, Voodoo Bear, TeleBots
- Gamaredon Group: Primitive Bear
- InvisiMole: Occasionally linked with Gamaredon
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
- APT29: Cozy Bear, The Dukes, Yttrium, Nobelium
Federal Security Service (FSB)
- Turla: Snake, Uroburos, Venomous Bear
- Berserk Bear: Energetic Bear, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly
- Krypton: Suspected ties to Turla
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