blogmirnet – Page 22 – My information Resource (blog.mir.net)

Elder Fraud Scams Persist

The NJCCIC received reports involving elder fraud scams that reflect recent tactics observed by the FBI. The scammers typically employ a multi-layered approach, impersonating associates of a technology company, a financial institution, and a US government official in sequence, a tactic commonly referred to as the “Phantom Hacker ” scam. The scammers may claim that the victim’s financial accounts were compromised or are at risk of being compromised, and, as a result, their funds need to be protected. In one reported incident, the scammers claimed to be federal investigators who had obtained a warrant for the arrest of the victim shortly after a close family member passed away.
The scammers typically persuade victims to liquidate their assets into cash or invest in gold, silver, or other precious metals. In some instances, the victims were instructed to wire funds to a precious metal dealer who claimed to ship the purchased commodities to the victims’ residences. Once a victim obtains the cash or precious metals, the scammers send couriers to retrieve the items at the victim’s home or a public location. The victim is assured that their assets will be protected in a secure account; however, the scammers sever contact shortly after the transaction, causing the victims to suffer significant financial losses.
Between May and December 2023, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) observed a significant increase in these fraudulent activities, resulting in combined losses exceeding $55 million. A similar incident was recently reported to the New Jersey State Police, involving a scammer who stole $13,000 from a victim in Hunterdon County, NJ, after the victim received a virus alert pop-up notification. Recommendations
Educate yourself and others about these and similar scams. The US government and legitimate businesses will never request you to purchase gold or other precious metals. Refrain from clicking on or contacting unknown telephone numbers found in unsolicited pop-up notifications, or links and attachments delivered via emails or text messages. Avoid downloading software at the request of unknown individuals, and refrain from allowing them to access your computer. Confirm the legitimacy of requests by contacting the sender via a separate means of communication, such as by phone, using contact information obtained from official sources before responding, divulging sensitive information, or providing funds.
Report malicious cyber activity to the FBI’s IC3 and the NJCCIC as quickly as possible to increase the likelihood of recovering funds. Be sure to include as much transaction information as possible, such as: The name of the person or company that made contact. Methods of communication used, including websites, emails, and telephone numbers. Any bank account numbers and the recipients’ names who received the wired funds. The name and location of the metal dealer company and the receiving account number if funds were wired to buy precious metals. Victims aged 60 or over who require assistance filing an IC3 complaint can contact the DOJ Elder Justice Hotline at 1-833-FRAUD-11 (833-372-8311). .

Enhancing Security of Devices and Components Across the Supply Chain | Draft Workshop Summary

NIST has released the initial public draft of Interagency Report (IR) 8532, Workshop on Enhancing Security of Devices and Components Across the Supply Chain. This report summarizes the presentations and discussions at a recent workshop on semiconductor security. Participants at the in-person workshop discussed existing and emerging cybersecurity threats and mitigation techniques for semiconductors throughout their life cycle.

The workshop obtained valuable feedback from industry, academia, and government to inform NIST’s development of cybersecurity and supply chain standards, guidance, and recommended practices. The discussion focused on semiconductor development and highlighted cybersecurity measurements and metrics that utilize reference data sets to facilitate the testing, attestation, certification, verification, and validation of semiconductor components. It also emphasized the use of automated cybersecurity tools and techniques to secure manufacturing environments throughout the development life cycle.

The public comment period for this draft is open through September 16, 2024. See the publication details for a copy of the draft and instructions for submitting comments.

Multiple Vulnerabilities in Ivanti Products Could Allow for Remote Code Execution – PATCH NOW

OVERVIEW:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Ivanti products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution.

Ivanti Avalanche is a mobile device management system.
Ivanti Neurons for ITSM is an IT Service Management Software.
Ivanti Virtual Traffic Manager is a software-based application delivery controller.

Successful exploitation could allow for remote code execution in the context of the system. Depending on the privileges associated with the system, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data.

THREAT INTELLEGENCE:

There are currently no reports of these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild.

SYSTEMS AFFECTED:

Ivanti Avalanche versions prior to 6.4.4
Ivanti Neurons for ITSM without supplied patch.
Ivanti Virtual Traffic Manager prior to versions 22.2R1, 22.3R3, 22.5R2, 22.6R2, 22.7R2

RISK:
Government:

Large and medium government entities: High
Small government entities: Medium

Businesses:

Large and medium business entities: High
Small business entities: Medium

Home users: Low

TECHNICAL SUMMARY:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Ivanti Products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution. Details of these vulnerabilities are as follows:

Tactic: Initial Access (TA0001):

Technique: Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190):

Improper input validation in the Central Filestore in Ivanti Avalanche 6.3.1 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin rights to achieve for remote code execution. (CVE-2024-37373)

Details of lower severity vulnerabilities:

Incorrect implementation of an authentication algorithm in Ivanti vTM other than versions 22.2R1 or 22.7R2 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication of the admin panel. (CVE-2024-7593)
An information disclosure vulnerability in Ivanti ITSM on-prem and Neurons for ITSM versions 2023.4 and earlier allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain the OIDC client secret via debug information. (CVE-2024-7569)
Improper certificate validation in Ivanti ITSM on-prem and Neurons for ITSM Versions 2023.4 and earlier allows a remote attacker in a MITM position to craft a token that would allow access to ITSM as any user. (CVE-2024-7570)
A NULL pointer dereference in WLAvalancheService in Ivanti Avalanche 6.3.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash the service, resulting in a DoS. (CVE-2024-37399)
An off-by-one error in WLInfoRailService in Ivanti Avalanche 6.3.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash the service, resulting in a DoS. (CVE-2024-36136)
XXE in SmartDeviceServer in Ivanti Avalanche 6.3.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary files on the server. (CVE-2024-38653)
Path traversal in the skin management component of Ivanti Avalanche 6.3.1 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to achieve denial of service via arbitrary file deletion. (CVE-2024-38652)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We recommend the following actions be taken:

Apply appropriate updates provided by Ivanti to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. (M1051: Update Software)
- Safeguard 7.1 : Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process: Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.
- Safeguard 7.2: Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process: Establish and maintain a risk-based remediation strategy documented in a remediation process, with monthly, or more frequent, reviews.
- Safeguard 7.4: Perform Automated Application Patch Management: Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.
- Safeguard 7.5 : Perform Automated Vulnerability Scans of Internal Enterprise Assets: Perform automated vulnerability scans of internal enterprise assets on a quarterly, or more frequent, basis. Conduct both authenticated and unauthenticated scans, using a SCAP-compliant vulnerability scanning tool.
- Safeguard 7.7: Remediate Detected Vulnerabilities: Remediate detected vulnerabilities in software through processes and tooling on a monthly, or more frequent, basis, based on the remediation process.
- Safeguard 12.1: Ensure Network Infrastructure is Up-to-Date: Ensure network infrastructure is kept up-to-date. Example implementations include running the latest stable release of software and/or using currently supported network-as-a-service (NaaS) offerings. Review software versions monthly, or more frequently, to verify software support.
- Safeguard 18.1: Establish and Maintain a Penetration Testing Program: Establish and maintain a penetration testing program appropriate to the size, complexity, and maturity of the enterprise. Penetration testing program characteristics include scope, such as network, web application, Application Programming Interface (API), hosted services, and physical premise controls; frequency; limitations, such as acceptable hours, and excluded attack types; point of contact information; remediation, such as how findings will be routed internally; and retrospective requirements.
- Safeguard 18.2: Perform Periodic External Penetration Tests: Perform periodic external penetration tests based on program requirements, no less than annually. External penetration testing must include enterprise and environmental reconnaissance to detect exploitable information. Penetration testing requires specialized skills and experience and must be conducted through a qualified party. The testing may be clear box or opaque box.
- Safeguard 18.3: Remediate Penetration Test Findings: Remediate penetration test findings based on the enterprise’s policy for remediation scope and prioritization.
Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services. Run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative privileges) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. (M1026: Privileged Account Management)
- Safeguard 4.7: Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software: Manage default accounts on enterprise assets and software, such as root, administrator, and other pre-configured vendor accounts. Example implementations can include: disabling default accounts or making them unusable.
- Safeguard 5.5: Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Accounts: Establish and maintain an inventory of service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, must contain department owner, review date, and purpose. Perform service account reviews to validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them. (M1016: Vulnerability Scanning)
- Safeguard 16.13: Conduct Application Penetration Testing: Conduct application penetration testing. For critical applications, authenticated penetration testing is better suited to finding business logic vulnerabilities than code scanning and automated security testing. Penetration testing relies on the skill of the tester to manually manipulate an application as an authenticated and unauthenticated user.
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. (M1030: Network Segmentation)
- Safeguard 12.2: Establish and Maintain a Secure Network Architecture: Establish and maintain a secure network architecture. A secure network architecture must address segmentation, least privilege, and availability, at a minimum.
Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring. (M1050: Exploit Protection)
- Safeguard 10.5: Enable Anti-Exploitation Features: Enable anti-exploitation features on enterprise assets and software, where possible, such as Microsoft® Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Windows® Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG), or Apple® System Integrity Protection (SIP) and Gatekeeper™.

REFERENCES:

Ivanti:
https://www.ivanti.com/blog/august-security-update
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Avalanche-6-4-4-CVE-2024-38652-CVE-2024-38653-CVE-2024-36136-CVE-2024-37399-CVE-2024-37373?language=en_US
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Neurons-for-ITSM-CVE-2024-7569-CVE-2024-7570?language=en_US&_gl=1*qipm4q*_gcl_au*Mjc2NTU1MTc5LjE3MjM1NzA2NjQ.
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Virtual-Traffic-Manager-vTM-CVE-2024-7593?language=en_US&_gl=1*qipm4q*_gcl_au*Mjc2NTU1MTc5LjE3MjM1NzA2NjQ.

Microsoft Security Public Webinars

Critical Patches Issued for Microsoft Products, August 13, 2024 – PATCH: NOW

OVERVIEW:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Microsoft products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution in the context of the logged on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.

THREAT INTELLIGENCE:
There are currently no reports of these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild.

SYSTEMS AFFECTED:

Windows Secure Kernel Mode
Windows Kerberos
Microsoft Windows DNS
Windows TCP/IP
Microsoft Office
Azure Connected Machine Agent
Windows Kernel
Windows Power Dependency Coordinator
Azure Stack
Azure Health Bot
Windows IP Routing Management Snapin
Windows NTFS
Microsoft Local Security Authority Server (lsasrv)
Windows Routing and Remote Access Service (RRAS)
Microsoft Bluetooth Driver
Microsoft Streaming Service
Windows Network Address Translation (NAT)
Windows Clipboard Virtual Channel Extension
Windows NT OS Kernel
Windows Resource Manager
Windows Deployment Services
Reliable Multicast Transport Driver (RMCAST)
Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock
Windows WLAN Auto Config Service
Windows Layer-2 Bridge Network Driver
Windows DWM Core Library
Windows Transport Security Layer (TLS)
Microsoft WDAC OLE DB provider for SQL
Windows Security Center
Azure IoT SDK
Windows Network Virtualization
Windows Mobile Broadband
Windows Update Stack
Windows Compressed Folder
Microsoft Dynamics
.NET and Visual Studio
Microsoft Office Visio
Microsoft Office Excel
Microsoft Office PowerPoint
Microsoft Office Outlook
Windows App Installer
Windows Scripting
Windows SmartScreen
Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers
Microsoft Office Project
Azure CycleCloud
Windows Common Log File System Driver
Microsoft Teams
Windows Print Spooler Components
Line Printer Daemon Service (LPD)
Microsoft Copilot Studio
Windows Mark of the Web (MOTW)
Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver
Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based)
Windows Initial Machine Configuration

RISK:
Government:

Large and medium government entities: High
Small government entities: Medium

Businesses:

Large and medium business entities: High
Small business entities: Medium

Home users: Low

TECHNICAL SUMMARY:
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Microsoft products, the most severe of which could allow for remote code execution.

A full list of all vulnerabilities can be found in the Microsoft link in the References section.

Successful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could result in an attacker gaining the same privileges as the logged-on user. Depending on the privileges associated with the user, an attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than those who operate with administrative user rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
We recommend the following actions be taken:

Apply appropriate patches or appropriate mitigations provided by Microsoft to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing. (M1051: Update Software)
- Safeguard 7.1: Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process: Establish and maintain a documented vulnerability management process for enterprise assets. Review and update documentation annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.
- Safeguard 7.4: Perform Automated Application Patch Management: Perform application updates on enterprise assets through automated patch management on a monthly, or more frequent, basis.
Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to all systems and services, and run all software as a non-privileged user (one without administrative rights) to diminish the effects of a successful attack. (M1026: Privileged Account Management)
- Safeguard 4.7: Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software: Manage default accounts on enterprise assets and software, such as root, administrator, and other pre-configured vendor accounts. Example implementations can include: disabling default accounts or making them unusable.
- Safeguard 5.4: Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts: Restrict administrator privileges to dedicated administrator accounts on enterprise assets. Conduct general computing activities, such as internet browsing, email, and productivity suite use, from the user’s primary, non-privileged account.
Remind all users not to visit untrusted websites or follow links/open files provided by unknown or untrusted sources. (M1017: User Training)
- Safeguard 14.1: Establish and Maintain a Security Awareness Program: Establish and maintain a security awareness program. The purpose of a security awareness program is to educate the enterprise’s workforce on how to interact with enterprise assets and data in a secure manner. Conduct training at hire and, at a minimum, annually. Review and update content annually, or when significant enterprise changes occur that could impact this Safeguard.
- Safeguard 14.2: Train Workforce Members to Recognize Social Engineering Attacks: Train workforce members to recognize social engineering attacks, such as phishing, pre-texting, and tailgating.
Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior. (M1040 : Behavior Prevention on Endpoint)
- Safeguard 13.2 : Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Detection Solution: Deploy a host-based intrusion detection solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate and/or supported.
- Safeguard 13.7 : Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution: Deploy a host-based intrusion prevention solution on enterprise assets, where appropriate and/or supported. Example implementations include use of an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) client or host-based IPS agent.

REFERENCES:

Microsoft:
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2024-Aug

Blue Screen of Death

A Denial of Service in CLFS.sys in Microsoft Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016, Windows Server 2019, and Windows Server 2022 allows a malicious authenticated low-privilege user to cause a Blue Screen of Death via a forced call to the KeBugCheckEx function.

CWE-ID	CWE Name	Source
CWE-1284	Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has finalized its principal set of encryption algorithms designed to withstand cyberattacks from a quantum computer.

Researchers around the world are racing to build quantum computers that would operate in radically different ways from ordinary computers and could break the current encryption that provides security and privacy for just about everything we do online. The algorithms announced today are specified in the first completed standards from NIST’s post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization project, and are ready for immediate use.

Observed TA2725 Phishing Campaigns

Observed TA2725 Phishing Campaigns

Example of phishing email delivering Mispadu. Image Source: Proofpoint.

TA2725 is a financially motivated cyber threat actor that typically targets Latin America (LATAM) and some European countries. The group has its tactics and is now delivering Mispadu and Astaroth malware in phishing campaigns targeting the Garden State Network (GSN). TA2725 primarily targets finance, services, manufacturing, law firms, and commercial facilities and uses a multi-stage infection process. TA2725 historically exploited Windows SmartScreen vulnerabilities; however, their most recent campaign tactics include sending phishing emails with URLs that lead to malware download pages, distributing malware through zipped files (MSI, HTA, exe, etc.), and employing geofencing tactics. They typically target banking credentials, as well as credentials and payment data for popular consumer accounts such as Netflix and Amazon. Other banking malware distributed in past campaigns includes Ousaban Stealer and Grandoreiro trojans.

Example of phishing email delivering Astaroth. Image Source: Proofpoint.

Phishing emails observed in this campaign use banking transaction lures in Spanish that include links to a zip file containing an HTA file. The final malware payload is Mispadu, a LATAM malware loader that typically drops banking malware and remote access trojans. HTA stands for HTML Applications and executes media files; however, it can also be used for malicious purposes without a GUI. In phishing campaigns delivering Astaroth, TA2725 uses emails with Portuguese language lures related to CENPROT shared documents and tax lures containing a zipped LNK file that leads to the Astaroth malware.

Recommendations

Facilitate user awareness training to include these types of phishing-based techniques. Avoid clicking links and opening attachments in unsolicited emails. Confirm requests from senders via contact information obtained from verified and official sources. Review the Don’t Take the Bait! Phishing and Other Social Engineering Attacks NJCCIC product for more information on common phishing and social engineering attacks. Maintain robust and up-to-date endpoint detection tools on every endpoint. Consider leveraging behavior-based detection tools rather than signature-based tools. Phishing and other malicious cyber activity can be reported to the FBI’s IC3 and the NJCCIC.

Phishing for (Stolen) Information

The NJCCIC observed an uptick in campaigns aiming to spread Formbook infostealing malware. Formbook is classified as malware-as-a-service (MaaS), though it was originally advertised as browser-logger software. Formbook can extract data from HTML forms and gain access to keystrokes, browsers auto-fill information, and clipboard data.

The email campaign spotted by Proofpoint included messages claiming to be Requests for Quotations (RFQ), purchasing orders, or invoices. The emails contained compressed executables that utilized Packager Shell Objects (OLE) to exploit vulnerabilities found in Equation Editor. After successful exploitation, LCG Kit downloads and installs Formbook, XLoader, Agent Tesla, and LokiBot. This is a new variation of a recurring campaign by the cyber threat group TA2536.

In May, security researchers discovered phishing attacks targeting small and medium-sized businesses (SMB) in Poland, Italy, and Romania. This campaign spread several malware types, including Formbook, Agent Tesla, and Remcos RAT . Threat actors imitated existing businesses and their employees to add legitimacy to their emails.

Recommendations

Avoid clicking links and opening attachments in unsolicited emails. Confirm requests from senders via contact information obtained from verified and official sources. Type official website URLs into browsers manually. Facilitate user awareness training to include these types of phishing-based techniques. Maintain robust and up-to-date endpoint detection tools on every endpoint. Consider leveraging behavior-based detection tools rather than signature-based tools.

Recent State-Sponsored Activity Impacting the Cyber Threat Landscape

The current state of heightened geopolitical unrest has led to nation-state threat actors launching cyberattacks to advance their political and economic agendas, thereby influencing and endangering critical information, as well as public safety and services. Recently exposed actions by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups and state-aligned hacking groups indicate an evolution in the cyber threat landscape and a fundamental shift in the goals and techniques of state-sponsored cyber operations. The main objectives of state-sponsored APT activities often involve strategic and industrial espionage, with their primary efforts focused on infiltrating systems to steal valuable data. However, recent changes in tactics, intensity, and expected outcomes were observed.

China

Increased tensions in the Asian Pacific region involving US allies like the Philippines and Taiwan have subsequently escalated cyber threat activity. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) modus operandi typically aims to position itself in systems to disrupt capabilities and could involve sabotaging critical infrastructure and industrial capacities, causing disruption and potential panic. A recent analysis report revealed that threat actors in the PRC-aligned cyberespionage ecosystem are engaging in an alarming trend of using ransomware as a final stage in their operations for financial gain, disruption, distraction, misattribution, or removal of evidence. Two clusters of activity involve ransomware or data encryption tooling – one linked to a suspected Chinese cyberespionage threat group, ChamelGang, and the second cluster resembling previous intrusions involving artifacts linked to suspected PRC and North Korean (DPRK) APT groups. Most affected organizations were primarily in the US, with manufacturing the most significantly impacted sector. Education, finance, healthcare, and legal sectors were also affected to a lesser degree. The use of ransomware by threat actors associated with the PRC and DPRK against government and critical infrastructure sectors denotes a shift in the intensity of cyber threats. Their dual objectives of financial gain and espionage underscore the need for heightened international cooperation and the implementation of robust defense strategies.

Another PRC State-sponsored cyber threat includes the hacking group Volt Typhoon, which has engaged in cyberespionage campaigns and aims to maintain a covert presence in networks while avoiding detection. There are concerns that the group is developing capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure during future crises, posing a risk to various sectors, including communications, transportation, water and wastewater, energy, military, defense, and maritime in the US and its territories, such as Guam.

A joint international cybersecurity advisory from agencies and law enforcement across eight countries, including the US, warns of the recently observed tactics used by the PRC State-sponsored threat group APT40, also known as Kryptonite Panda and GINGHAM TYPHOON. This group conducts malicious cyber operations for the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) and is based in Haikou, Hainan Province, PRC.

Russia

Recorded Future analysts identified a likely Russian government-aligned influence network known as CopyCop has shifted its focus to the 2024 US elections. CopyCop creates and spreads political content using AI and inauthentic websites to disseminate targeted content through YouTube videos. In June, analysts discovered the network expanded its influential content sources to include mainstream news outlets in the US and UK, conservative-leaning US media, and Russian State-affiliated media. Within twenty-four hours of registering and posting the original articles, CopyCop scrapes, modifies, and disseminates content to US election-themed websites using over 1,000 fake journalist personas. Despite the content being generated rapidly, AI-generated content for this campaign was not observed being widely shared on social media platforms.

Earlier this year, Microsoft identified an ongoing cyberattack, cautioning that the Russian APT Midnight Blizzard (APT 29, Cozy Bear) continues to attempt to exploit various shared secrets for further attacks via email. Recent Microsoft notifications on social media reveal that the hack had a broader impact on the company’s customer base. Additionally, Midnight Blizzard was attributed to the recent cyberattack that breached the remote access software company TeamViewer. The company noted that the incident occurred on June 26 after their security team detected an irregularity in TeamViewer’s internal corporate IT environment.

The US intends to prohibit Kaspersky Labs antivirus software, a company headquartered in Moscow that serves 400 million users and 250,000 corporate customers globally, over national security concerns. The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) indicated that the ban will take effect on September 29. BIS reached this decision due to the potential influence of the Russian military and intelligence authorities on the company, which is subject to Russian Government jurisdiction. Individuals and businesses that continue to use existing Kaspersky products and services will not face legal penalties; however, any individual or business that continues to use Kaspersky products and services assumes all cybersecurity and associated risks, which could spell disaster with cyber insurance claims.

DPRK

Recently, American cybersecurity company KnowBe4 hired a Principal Software Engineer who was later discovered to be a DPRK State cyber threat actor who attempted to install information-stealing malware on the network. Despite passing background checks and interviews, the threat actor used a stolen identity and AI tools to deceive the hiring process. This type of impersonation and insider threat highlights the advanced tactics of DPRK nation-state threat actors’ attempts to infiltrate US companies.

A DPRK-linked cyberespionage group, now known as APT45, has expanded its operations to include financially motivated attacks involving ransomware. The group has used ransomware families known as SHATTEREDGLASS and Maui to target organizations in South Korea, Japan, and the US. This shift in focus emphasizes the importance of staying updated on threat intelligence to address current threats.

Kimsuky is a DPRK APT cyber threat group that conducts worldwide attacks to gather intelligence aligned with the DPRK government’s interest. Kimsuky’s primary focus is gathering intelligence on foreign policy, national security considerations regarding the Korean peninsula, and nuclear policy. A 2023 United Nations report revealed the involvement of DPRK State hackers in unprecedented levels of cryptocurrency theft in the previous year. The theft was estimated to be between $630 million and over $1 billion in 2022 alone, doubling Pyongyang’s illicit gains from cyber theft.

Iran

MuddyWater, an Iranian cyber threat group linked to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), has intensified cyberattacks on Israel and its allies during the Israeli-Hamas War. The group typically uses phishing campaigns and has recently introduced a new custom backdoor called BugSleep. They increasingly use English to target various sectors and regions using themes like webinars and online courses in phishing emails. Their malware can execute multiple commands and target a wide range of global entities, primarily focusing on Israeli and Saudi Arabian targets. MuddyWater targets various sectors, including telecommunications, government (IT services), and the oil industry. They have expanded their cyberespionage operations, focusing on governmental and defense institutions in Central and Southwest Asia and businesses in North America and Europe.

Recommendations:

Implement cybersecurity best practices to reduce risk and increase resiliency to cyber threats as detailed on the NJCCIC Guidance and Best Practices webpage, in addition to the following:

Avoid clicking links, responding to, or otherwise acting on unsolicited text messages or emails.
Use strong, unique passwords and enable MFA for all accounts where available, choosing authentication apps or hardware tokens over SMS text-based codes.
Keep systems up to date and apply patches after appropriate testing.
Utilize monitoring and detection solutions to identify suspicious login attempts and user behavior.
Enforce the principle of least privilege, disable unused ports and services, and use web application firewalls (WAFs).
Employ a comprehensive data backup plan and ensure operational technology (OT) environments are segmented from the information technology (IT) environments.
Cyber incidents can be reported to the FBI’s IC3 and the NJCCIC.